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The current paper explores the application and revision process of the Ac-
quired Rights Directive in the context of insolvency proceedings, focusing on 
the role of community and national (British and Italian) case law. It therefore 
analyzes, from a comparative perspective, the inevitable conflict between these 
disciplines, and the related implementation of the EU Directive in Italy and in 
the United Kingdom.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This work analyzes the impact of Directive 77/187/EEC
2 (hereinafter referred 
to as the “Acquired Rights Directive” or the “Directive”) on insolvent compa-
nies and the long and difficult process of revising the Directive. This process 
has recently led to the adoption of Directive 98/50/EC
3 (the “Amending Di-
rective”) by the Council of the European Communities. 
The  European  Court  of  Justice  (“ECJ”)  and  the  national  courts  of  the 
Member States have been the principal actors of the revision process. The im-
portance of both the ECJ and national case law is demonstrated by the fact 
that the Amending Directive has modified and replaced numerous provisions 
of the Acquired Rights Directive on the basis of principles developed by the 
ECJ in response to the wishes of national judges. This work will, therefore, fo-
cus on the pronouncements of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) as well 
as those of British and Italian courts attempting to define the scope of the Di-
rective with regard to insolvent companies.  
The Directive introduced the principle of compulsory transfer of employ-
ment relationships and associated liabilities upon the transfer of an undertak-
ing
4. However, it did not include any express provision concerning insolvent 
companies. The problem arising in the context of transfers of insolvent under-
taking is to strike a balance between the acquired rights of the insolvent com-
pany’s employees and the interests of other creditors. The employees of an in-
solvent  company  are  probably  those  who  are  most  in  need  of  protection. 
However,  the  application  of  the  Directive  to  insolvent  business  transfers 
would only benefit the employees whose claims are met in full to the detriment 
of other creditors. In addition, the prospect of taking over liabilities connected 
to employment contracts would either deter potential transferees from pur-
chasing the insolvent business or cause the transferor to discount the price 
which potential transferees would be otherwise prepared to pay. In the first 
case, where no purchaser is found, creditors would probably prefer to sell the 
                                                 
2 OJ 1977 L 61/27, Council Directive 77/187/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of the transfer of undertakings, businesses, or parts of busi-
nesses. 
3 OJ 1998 L 201/88.  
4 Art. 3 (1). G. SIGILLÒ MASSARA  4 
assets of the undertaking separately. As a consequence, the entire workforce 
would be dismissed, and the application of the Directive would have the oppo-
site effect of that which was intended. In the second case, where the transferee 
pays less for the business transferred, the assets in the transferor’s hands would 
be diminished to the detriment of the transferor’s creditors.  
In cases which came before it, the European Court of Justice extensively in-
terpreted the Acquired Rights Directive so as to ensure, or at least with the in-
tention of ensuring, that the balance between the interests of employees and 
creditors was weighted in favour of the protection of employees’ rights. The 
ECJ held the Directive applicable to a number of insolvency proceedings.   
British and Italian courts took a different approach in regards to the rulings 
of  the  ECJ.  Italian  courts  carried out  a  direct  dialogue  with  the  European 
Court. They often referred to the ECJ for preliminary rulings, and made sub-
stantial efforts to read the pre-existing national law in light of ECJ’s rulings. 
British courts, on the other hand, did not make any reference to the ECJ for 
preliminary rulings. Nevertheless, they have interpreted national law pursuant 
to ECJ case law, adapting the latter to the specific domestic background.  
Both British and Italian courts and national academic writers have empha-
sized the problems arising from the application of the Directive to insolvent 
business transfers. After a long, difficult process of revising the 1977 Directive, 
the Amending Directive has been adopted. It modifies the Acquired Rights Di-
rective, consolidating the case law of the ECJ. In the area of insolvency, the 
changes are essentially deregulatory. In a number of key issues, Member States 
are granted a wide degree of discretion in applying the Directive itself.  
The structure of the current work follows the process of the revision of the 
Acquired Rights Directive. Therefore, after a brief analysis of the relevant pro-
visions of the Directive itself, it presents an investigation and elucidation of the 
criteria for excluding insolvent companies from the application of the Direc-
tive as set forth by the ECJ. Some of the most relevant pronouncements of the 
ECJ will be examined in detail in order to show how the European Court has 
widely interpreted the Directive. The criticisms of the expansive approach of 
the ECJ will also be taken into account.   
Part 2, following a brief analysis of the pre-Directive situation, concentrates 
on the implementation of the Directive in the United Kingdom, and the rele-Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    5 
vant  Transfer  of  Undertakings  (Protection  of  Employment)  Regulations  of 
1981 are analyzed. The mechanism of “hiving-down” is also examined. Indeed, 
only with regard to “hiving-down”, in the possible clash between the interests 
of the company’s creditors and the employees’ acquired rights, was granted ab-
solute priority to the former. Next is an analysis of how British courts have ap-
plied the case law of the ECJ and the principles that the Court has established 
as well as which UK insolvency proceedings have been recognized as falling 
outside the scope of the Directive.    
Part 3 concerns the implementation of the Directive in Italy. First, the sec-
tion focuses on prior national law and, in particular, on Article 2112 of Italian 
Civil Code which, since 1942, endorsed the principle of compulsory transfer of 
contracts of employment upon the transfer of an undertaking. This is followed 
by a detailed analysis of Article 47 of Law No. 428 of 1990, which imple-
mented the Acquired Rights Directive in Italy. Particular attention is drawn to 
paragraph 5 of Article 47 of Law No. 428 of 1990. This paragraph was intro-
duced in 1990 following the already existing case law of the ECJ and provided 
for derogation from article 2112 of Italian Civil Code in the case of insolvent 
business transfers. In the last section of Part 3, the approach adopted by the 
Italian courts in comparison to British courts is analyzed.  
Finally, Part 4 is focused on recent amendments to the Directive and, in 
particular, on the changes in relation to the transfer of insolvent businesses. 
Emphasis is on how the Amending Directive exemplifies the Community’s 
current “light touch” approach to labor legislation. The new Article 4a inserted 
in the 1977 text and the impact of the Amending Directive of employees’ 
rights are examined. An update on the transposition process in the UK and It-
aly is given and a few general points on the process of revising the 1977 Direc-
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2. Transfer of undertakings and insolvency proceedings in the 
interpretation of the European Court of Justice 
 
2.1  Outline of the relevant provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive  
 
The Acquired Rights Directive constituted a legislative response to concerns 
over  the  impact  of  business  restructuring  –  taking  place  in  the  late  1970s 
throughout the territory of the Community – on affected employees. The pri-
mary purpose  of the Directive was “to provide for the protection of employ-
ees in the event of a change of employer, in particular to ensure that their 
rights were safeguarded”
5.  
The Directive was also designed to achieve a particular economic objective 
which, as Barnard has identified, was to “assist the process of restructuring, al-
lowing more competitive and efficient undertakings to emerge. Consequently, 
the managerial right to restructure and to dismiss employees was never ques-
tioned”
6. The operation of this “managerial right” was nevertheless constrained 
under the Directive.  
First, the Directive states that the employees’ representatives are to be in-
formed and consulted in the event that a transfer is foreseen. Beyond such 
consultation rights, Article 3 (1) sets out the principal effect of the transfer of 
an  undertaking  in  respect  to  the  employees.  It  provides  for  the  automatic 
transfer from the transferor to the transferee of all the transferor’s rights and 
obligations arising from a contract of employment or from an employment re-
lationship existing on the date of the transfer.  
The Directive, then, declares that the transfer of an undertaking “shall not 
in itself constitute grounds for dismissal” of an employee by either the trans-
feror or the transferee
7. This protection against dismissal is not absolute. It 
does not cover dismissals taking place for “economic, technical or organisa-
tional reasons”.  
 
                                                 
5 As stated in the preamble of the Directive.  
6 Barnard, Catharine, EC Employment Law (Oxford University Press: Second Edition 2000), at 445.                                         
7 Article 4(1).  Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    7 
2.2  Application of the Directive to transfers of insolvent companies by 
the European Court of Justice 
 
The Acquired Rights Directive makes no express provision for the position of 
companies which are transferred in the context of insolvency proceedings. The 
ECJ attempted to define the scope of the Directive in this regard in several 
judgments.  
 
2.2.1  The Abels case: Insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings 
 
In Abels
8, the ECJ was called on to decide whether the scope of the Directive 
extended to a situation in which the transferor of an undertaking was insolvent 
or was granted a “surseance van betaling” (judicial leave to suspend payment of 
debts) under the Netherlands legislation. 
To an English lawyer, this could appear to be a surprising question: the 
English version of the Directive states that it applies to “a legal transfer or 
merger”, so there is no reason to exclude transfers by insolvent transferors. In 
domestic UK law, which has implemented the Directive, the concept of legal 
transfer has been interpreted so as to mean a transfer “effected by sale or by 
some other disposition or by operation of law”
9. This again suggests no exclu-
sion of transfer by insolvent companies. However, a number of Member States 
– including Italy – have translated the Directive in their language as applying 
only  to  contractual  transfer  (“cessione  contrattuale”  in  the  Italian  version). 
Transfers by insolvent companies are not consensual and so should be outside 
the scope of the Directive.   
Because of those differences in the various versions of the Directive, the 
ECJ, in Abels, refused to adopt a textual interpretation. It referred, first, to the 
relationship between the Directive and the rules of insolvency and, secondly, 
to the purpose of the Directive itself. 
As the ECJ noted, in all Member States the insolvency law consists of spe-
cific rules, which may except, at least partially, from other provisions of a gen-
eral nature, including provisions of social law. The specificity of insolvency law 
                                                 
8 Case C-135/83 H.B.M. Abels v The Administrative Board of the Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en de Electrotech-
nische Industrie [1985] ECR 469.  
9 Regulation 3 (2) of Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981.  G. SIGILLÒ MASSARA  8 
is also confirmed in community law
10. For those reasons, the Court stated that 
“if the directive had been intended to apply also to transfers of undertakings in 
the context of such proceedings, an express provision would have been in-
cluded for that purpose”
11. 
The Court went on to examine the purpose of the Directive. It determined 
that the purpose was to ensure that the restructuring of undertakings within 
the common market does not adversely affect workers in the undertakings in 
regards to the need (referred to in Art. 117 of the EEC Treaty) “to promote 
improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for work-
ers”.  
In this regard, the Court recognized that it was not clear whether the appli-
cation of the Directive to insolvent companies would have been favorable or 
prejudicial to the interests of employees. On the one hand, employees whose 
employer has been judged to be insolvent are precisely those who are most in 
need of protection. On the other hand, such an extension of the scope of the 
Directive might dissuade a potential transferee from acquiring an undertaking 
on conditions acceptable to the creditors. In such a situation, creditors would 
probably prefer to sell the assets of the undertaking separately. The conse-
quence will be the loss of all jobs in the undertaking, detracting from the use-
fulness of the Directive. 
Therefore, the ECJ concluded that the Directive did not impose on Mem-
ber States the obligation to extend the rules laid down therein to the transfer of 
undertakings, businesses, or parts of businesses taking place in the context of 
insolvency proceedings which are instituted in view of the liquidation of the 
assets of the transferor under the supervision of the competent judicial author-
ity. Nevertheless, as the Court clarified, the Member States were free to apply 
the principles of the Directive, wholly or in part, on the basis of their national 
law. The question submitted by the national court also raised the question of 
whether a transfer, taking place in proceedings such as a “surseance van be-
taling”, fell outside the scope of the Directive.  
                                                 
10Article 1.2 (d) of Council Directive 75/129/EEC, relating to collective redundancies, expressly excludes from its 
scope workers affected by termination of an establishment activities “where that is the result of a judicial decision”. 
Moreover, the Council has adopted Directive 80/987/EEC specifically relating to the protection of employees in 
the event of the insolvency of their employer.  
11 [1985] ECR 469 para. 17. Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    9 
The Court noted that “proceedings such as those relating to a surseance van 
betaling have certain features in common with liquidation proceedings, in par-
ticular inasmuch as the proceedings are, in both cases, of a judicial nature”
12. 
However, as the ECJ found out, they are different from liquidation proceed-
ings “in so far as the supervision exercised by the court over the commence-
ment and the course of such proceedings is more limited”. Moreover, such 
proceedings, in the ECJ’s opinion, aim to safeguard the assets of the insolvent 
undertaking and, where possible, to continue the business of the undertaking. 
Only when such continuation is no longer possible can proceedings of this 
kind, as in Abels, lead to the liquidation of the debtor. 
The ECJ concluded that the reasons for not applying the Directive to the 
transfer of undertakings taking place in liquidation proceedings were not appli-
cable to proceedings such as a “surseance van betaling” which took place at an 
earlier stage
13.  
The Court confirmed its judgement in Abels regarding three other judg-
ments  delivered  on  the  same  day
14.  After  those  judgments,  it  was  widely 
thought that all transfers related to insolvency proceedings were removed from 
the scope of the Directive. However, this view has been fundamentally altered 
by the subsequent decision of the ECJ in D’Urso & ors v Ercole Marelli Elettro-
meccanica Generale SpA. & Ors
15. 
 
2.2.2  D’Urso: The transfer of a business subject to special creditors’ 
arrangement procedures 
 
In this case, the ECJ was required to decide whether the Directive applied to 
transfers of undertakings subject to the Italian “special administration” proce-
dure. The Court referred to its earlier judgement in Abels and held that that the 
decisive test used to establish whether the Directive did or did not apply was 
the purpose of the procedure in question. The Directive does not apply to 
proceedings designed to liquidate the transferor’s assets, but does apply to pro-
                                                 
12 [1985] ECR 469 para. 28. 
13 [1985] ECR 469 para. 29. 
14 Case C-19/83 Knud Wendelboe and Others v L.J. Music ApS in liquidation [1985] ECR 457; Case C-179/83 Industrie-
bond FNV and Another v Netherlands State [1985] ECR 511; Case C-186/83 Arie Botzen and Others v Rotterdamsche 
Droogdok Maatschappij BV [1985] ECR 519.   
15 Case C-362/89 [1991] ECR I-4105 G. SIGILLÒ MASSARA  10
ceedings whose main purpose is to safeguard the assets and, where possible, to 
continue the business of the undertaking.   
The ECJ went on to analyze the purpose of the “special administration proce-
dure”
16. The Italian “special administration procedure” applies to large undertakings 
which the judicial authorities have determined to be in a state of insolvency or 
to have failed to pay salaries during a period of three months, and are governed 
by the provision of Italian law on compulsory administrative winding-up.  
The Court noted that the ministerial decree, which sets the procedure in 
motion, has, or may have, two kinds of effects. It can set forth a procedure for 
the compulsory administrative liquidation of the undertaking’s assets in order 
to settle creditors’ claims on the company. Compulsory administrative liquida-
tion has effects which, in substance, are identical to those of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Alternatively, as in D’Urso, the decree may also authorize the under-
taking to continue trading under the supervision of a receiver for a period of 
time.  
The Court held that the special administration of large undertakings in criti-
cal difficulty has different characteristics depending on whether or not the de-
cree authorizes the undertaking to continue trading:  
“If no decision is taken on that last matter or if the period of validity of a 
decision authorising the undertaking to continue trading has expired, like in-
solvency proceedings, that procedure is designed to liquidate the debtor's as-
sets in order to satisfy the body of creditors” and “transfers effected under this 
legal framework are consequently excluded from the scope of the Directive”. 
When the decree authorizes the undertaking to continue trading under the 
supervision of an auditor, the primary purpose is to give the undertaking some 
stability, allowing its future activity to be safeguarded. In this case, as the ECJ 
concluded, the Directive does apply. In D’Urso, the ECJ clarified the scope of 
the exclusion envisaged in Abels. It made clear that it is not the degree of con-
trol exercised by the judicial or administrative authority over the procedure that 
determines when the Directive applies, but the purpose of the insolvency pro-
cedure in question.  
When the procedure in question aims to liquidate the debtor’s property by 
realizing the assets in order to satisfy the creditors, the Directive does not ap-
                                                 
16 See chapter III, para. 3.4. Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    11 
ply. Those procedures are generally characterized by very wide judicial control, 
preventing the debtor from exercising his power of dealing with and managing 
his assets with the aim of safeguarding assets and protecting the interests of 
creditors. When the procedure in question aims to deal with temporary diffi-
culties in order to enable the undertaking to continue to trade, the Directive 
does apply. Generally speaking, in those procedures, the judicial control is lim-
ited in scope without preventing the debtor from dealing with or managing the 
assets. That type of procedure might result in a declaration of insolvency, but 
the possibility is not enough to exclude the application of the Directive. As 
stated by Advocate-General Van Gerven in D’Urso, “it is not enough that the 
preconditions for the insolvency of the transferor are fulfilled for a transfer to 
be excluded from the scope of the Directive”.   
It would not be correct to conclude that the ECJ merely confirmed its pre-
vious approach in Abels. Rather, D’Urso can be considered as “a strengthening 
of its previous position”
17. The ECJ “took (silently) another step towards ex-
tending the scope of the Directive”
18.  
 
2.2.3  Spano: The transfer of an undertaking in critical difficulties 
 
The Court reaffirmed its D’Urso decision in Spano and Others v Fiat Geotech and 
Fiat Hitachi
19. In this case, the European Court of Justice was required to verify 
whether Article 47 (5) of Italian Law No. 428 of 1990 was consistent with the 
Directive.  
Such a provision applies to undertakings declared by the Ministerial Com-
mittee for the Co-ordination of Industrial Policy (hereinafter referred to as 
“CIPI”) to be in critical difficulty
20. It introduced derogation from Article 2112 
of the Italian Civil Code. This article provides that, in the event of the transfer 
of an undertaking, employment relationships are to continue to exist with the 
new owner and that the employees' rights under those relationships are to be 
preserved. 
                                                 
17 Leccese, Vito, “Italian Courts, the ECJ and Transfers of Undertakings: A Multi-Speed Dialogue?” (1999) 5 EuLJ  
315 at 320. 
18 Ibid..  
19 Case C-472/93 [1995] ECR I-4321 
20 Pursuant to Article 2 (5) (c) of Italian law No. 675 of 1977. G. SIGILLÒ MASSARA  12
The ECJ recalled its rulings in Abels and D’Urso and held that the determining 
factor to be taken into consideration in deciding whether the Directive applied 
was the purpose of the procedure in question. In the Court’s view, the purpose 
of declaring that an undertaking is facing critical difficulties is to enable the 
undertaking itself to retrieve its economic and financial situation and, above all, 
to preserve jobs. A declaration by the CIPI that an undertaking is facing critical 
difficulties is conditional upon the submission of a recovery plan. An undertak-
ing found to be in critical difficulties is subject to a procedure which, far from 
being aimed at the liquidation of the undertaking, is designed, on the contrary, 
to promote the continuation of its business in view of its subsequent recovery. 
Unlike insolvency proceedings, an undertaking declared to be facing critical 
difficulties is not subject to any judicial supervision or any measure whereby 
the assets of the undertaking are put under administration, and no suspension 
of payments is granted. 
For those reasons, the Court concluded that “the economic and social objective 
pursued by that procedure cannot explain or justify the circumstance that, when all or part of 
the undertaking concerned is transferred, its employees lose the rights which the directive con-
fers on them”.  
 
2.2.4 The Déthier case: Transfer of undertakings and judicial winding-
up 
 
The Court was obliged to give more detailed guidance about the nature of the 
distinction between insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings in the Déthier 
Equipment case
21. In this case, the national court raised the question of whether 
the Acquired Rights Directive applied to the transfer of an undertaking which 
was wound-up by the court pursuant to Belgian law.  
Under Belgian law, the procedure for winding-up companies takes place af-
ter the dissolution of a commercial company
22. It is designed to allow the com-
pany to conclude business transactions already entered into while precluding it, 
as a rule, from engaging in new business. Following their dissolution, commer-
cial companies are deemed to exist for the purposes of liquidation even if they 
                                                 
21 Case C-319/94 [1998] ECR I-1061. 
22 See Articles 178 to 188 of the Lois Coordonnées sur les Sociétés Commerciales (Consolidated Laws on Commer-
cial Companies). Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    13
have already ceased all trading. Dissolution automatically brings to an end the 
functions of all organs of the company, which are replaced by one or more liq-
uidators. The liquidators are appointed by the members in a general meeting
23 
or, if the majority laid down by the law is not obtained, by the court. In the 
first case, the liquidation is called voluntary winding-up (“liquidation volon-
taire”). In the second it is referred to as winding-up by the court (“liquidation 
judiciaire”).  
In his opinion, Advocate General Lenz stated that the judgments in D’Urso 
and Spano could not simply be applied without further qualification of the liq-
uidation. In those cases, the Court had considered the purpose of the con-
tinuation of the business to be a decisive criterion for the application of the 
Directive. Advocate General Lenz concluded that the continuation of trading 
itself, and not the aim pursued by the continuation of the trading, was decisive. 
To the extent that the undertaking in liquidation continues trading, neither the 
fact of putting it into liquidation nor the fact that continuation of trading is 
aimed at the liquidation of the undertaking, and not its survival, can justify the 
loss by its employees of the rights which the Directive confers upon them.  
This is the opinion that the Court followed. It concluded from the forego-
ing case law that the determining factor to be taken into consideration in de-
ciding whether the Directive applies to the transfer of an undertaking subject 
to an administrative or judicial procedure is the purpose of the procedure in 
question. Following the opinion of the Advocate General, the Court stated that 
if the purpose of the procedure is not immediately conclusive, then account 
should be taken of the form of the procedure in question (in particular in so 
far as it means that the undertaking continues or ceases trading), and of the Di-
rective's objectives.  
Therefore, the Court first examined the purpose of the procedure for wind-
ing-up by the court, which it did not consider decisive in itself for the resolu-
tion of the case. It then examined the characteristic features of that procedure.  
With regard to the purpose of the procedure, the Court determined that the 
objective of the winding-up by the Belgian court is liquidation by realizing the 
company's assets for the benefit of the company itself and of its creditors. Li-
abilities exceeding assets is not a condition for putting a company into liquida-
                                                 
23 Unless they are already named in the company's articles of association. G. SIGILLÒ MASSARA  14
tion. Although liquidation may be a stage which precedes insolvency, it can 
also occur, as the Belgian Government stated, when the members no longer 
wish to cooperate. So, while the purpose of winding-up by a court under Bel-
gian law may sometimes be similar to that of insolvency proceedings, this is 
not conclusive. Liquidation proceedings may be used whenever it is wished to 
bring a company's activities to an end and whatever is the reason for that 
course.  
The Court went on to consider the form of the procedure in question. The 
Court noted that the undertaking continued to trade while it was being wound-
up by the court. In such circumstances, continuity of the business was assured 
when the undertaking was transferred. There was, therefore, no justification 
for depriving employees of the rights guaranteed under the Directive.  
 




24, the Court applied its ruling in Déthier to the case of voluntary 
liquidation. In this case, the domestic court referred to the European Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling on the question of whether the Directive ap-
plied when a company in voluntary liquidation, under Belgian law, had trans-
ferred all or part of its assets to another company.  
As the ECJ pointed out, voluntary liquidation is essentially similar to wind-
ing-up by the court, save for the fact that it falls to the shareholders in general 
meeting, and not to the court, to make the decision to wind-up the company, 
appoint the liquidators, and determine their powers.  
Thus, in the Court’s view, at least in some procedural respects, voluntary 
liquidation has even less in common with insolvency than winding-up by the 
court. Therefore, the reasons which had led the Court to hold in Dethier Équi-
pement that the Directive was to apply to transfers occurring when an undertak-
ing was wound-up by the court were all the more pertinent when the undertak-
ing transferred was wound-up voluntarily.  
                                                 
24 Case C-399/96 Europièces SA, in liquidation v Wilfried Sanders and Automotive Industries Holding Company SA, declared in-
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In light of the foregoing, the ECJ reached the conclusion that the Directive 
applied to the transfer of a business made by a company in voluntary liquida-
tion, under the relevant Belgian law.  
 
2.3  The approach of the ECJ  
 
There was little consensus after the ECJ judgments. The approach of the ECJ 
in Abels has been described as “ultimately unsatisfactory and even incoherent”
25.  
The reasoning behind ECJ’s conclusion has been considered “rather weak”
26. 
Since the Court has accepted that uncertainty exists regarding the effect of the 
application of the Directive in the case of an employer’s insolvency, there must 
be a risk that the Court, contrary to the Treaty, is depriving of protection those 
most in need of it.   
The difference drawn by the Court between pre-liquidation and liquidation 
proceedings has been considered inadequate
27. The argument for not applying 
the Directive to liquidation is that it might dissuade a potential transferee from 
acquiring an undertaking and lead to the sale of the assets of the undertaking 
on a break-up basis. However, the choice between the sale of the business as a 
going concern and on a break-up basis lies with the insolvency practitioner. It 
does not arise only when the company is put into liquidation. Insolvency prac-
titioners will choose the method that most benefits the creditors, whether the 
company  is  in  liquidation  or  in  the  context  of  pre-insolvency proceedings. 
Therefore, it is difficult to understand why the argument for exemption from 
the Directive does not apply equally to pre-liquidation proceedings. In addi-
tion, the “protectionist” line adopted by the Court has generated much criti-
cism among the academic writers of the Member States
28.  
The Directive aimed to balance employment protectionism with commer-
cial realism. Through the many references for preliminary rulings which have 
come before it from the national courts, the European Court of Justice has en-
sured that this balance is weighted in favor of the protection of employees’ 
rights. The expansive approach pursued by the Court of Justice has effectively 
                                                 
25Davies, Paul, “Acquired Rights, Creditors’ Rights, Freedom of Contract and Industrial Democracy”, (1989) 9 YEL 
21 at  45.  
26 Davies, Paul, op. cit., n. 24  at 46. 
27 Ibid..   
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resulted in a situation where a Directive designed in part to facilitate the trans-
fer of business
29 has acted as a deterrent to such transfers. 
Finally, the expansive jurisprudence of the ECJ has also been considered as 
conflicting with the current employment policy commitments, which have em-
phasized the need for labor flexibility
30.  
 
3. Business transfers and corporate insolvency in the UK 
 
3.1   Prior national law and the implementation of the Acquired Rights 
Directive in the UK 
 
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 
(hereinafter referred to as “TUPE” Regulations) constitute the UK domestic 
legislation implementing the Acquired Rights Directive. Regulations 5(1) and 
(3) provide that, following a “relevant transfer”
31, all of the transferor’s rights, 
powers, duties, and liabilities under or connected to any contract of employ-
ment of any person employed in the undertaking “immediately before” the 
transfer will be inherited by the transferee. Regulation 8(1) provides that dis-
missals in connection with the transfer are automatically unfair, unless they are 
for an “economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the 
workforce” (hereinafter referred to as “ETO” reason). In this case, Regulation 
8(2) deems them to be dismissals for a substantial reason in the context of the 
ordinary law of unfair dismissal. 
Unlike the position in Italy - where the principle of the compulsory transfer 
of  contracts  of  employment  upon  the  transfer  of  a  business  was  a  long-
established part of the national labor law dating even from the pre-war period - 
in the UK, the pre-Directive law had always been based on the principle of 
freedom of contract and, in particular, the freedom to choose one’s contracting 
party. Upon the transfer of a business, the transferee was free to offer em-
ployment to members of the transferor’s staff as it pleased and on such terms 
as it thought fit. The employees of the transferor to whom offers of employ-
                                                 
29 See Section 1.1 above 
30 See e.g. the Commission’s 1993 White Paper, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward 
into the 21st Century Bull EC, Supp. 6/93; COM (93) 700. 
31 It is defined in Reg. 3 (1) as a “transfer from one person to another of an undertaking … or part of one”. Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    17
ment were made were equally free to accept them or not. Therefore, in the 
UK, the Directive’s principle of the compulsory transfer of contracts of em-
ployment and the associated principle that dismissals for reasons connected 
with the transfer were ineffective had profound impacts, particularly in the case 
of insolvent companies.  
 
3.2  Insolvent companies and TUPE 
 
An insolvency practitioner will commonly decide that it is in the interest of the 
insolvency  proceedings  for  the  existing  business  of  the  insolvent  employer 
company to be transferred as a going concern. Such a transfer can either be: 
a)  by way of a disposal of the business to an unconnected third party, or al-
ternatively, 
b)  by way of a  “hive-down” of the business from the insolvent employer 
company to a subsidiary company newly formed for this purpose.  
The transfer of a business, whether to a third party or by way of a “hive-
down”, will usually constitute a transfer of an undertaking within the scope of 
the TUPE Regulations.  
The TUPE Regulations do not expressly provide for the exclusion of trans-
fers made by insolvent companies. Regulation 4 (concerning “hive-down”) is, 
instead, an indication that TUPE Regulations are intended to apply to insol-
vent companies. Moreover, Regulation 3(2) provides that the Regulations apply 
“whether the transfer is affected by a sale or by some other disposition or by operation of law”. 
These words gave rise to the possible interpretation that the Regulations could 
apply to all insolvency/liquidation situations. Regulation 3(2) can be consid-
ered as a more favorable provision for employees introduced by national law 
pursuant to Art. 7 of the Directive
32. 
                                                 
32 However, there may be some doubt as to whether the TUPE Regulations could introduce provisions more favor-
able to employees within the meaning of Article 7 of the Directive. The TUPE Regulations were, in fact, introduced 
by a statutory instrument under the special provision of s. 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972, rather than 
by a formal Act of Parliament. The question is whether legislation under s. 2 (2) of the European Communities Act 
must be specifically directed to the implementation of the European obligation or whether it may go further. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) in Scotland, in Addison v Denholm Ship Management (UK) Ltd ([1997] ICR 770, 
[1997] IRLR 389, EAT), stated that “ as a matter of general law in relation to primary and subordinate legislation 
(….) if the Directive is to be regarded as a parent, the child cannot be larger, wider or have greater implications than 
its parent allows”.  
In Addison v Denholm, the EAT also stated that if the effect of the TUPE Regulations is “to confer a lesser exclusion, 
and less wider benefit, to workers otherwise excluded by the Directive” it can be considered “ultra vires the ena-G. SIGILLÒ MASSARA  18
However, TUPE Regulations were enacted to implement the Acquired Rights 
Directive. In the Directive, there is no express exemption for transfers of un-
dertakings in the context of insolvency proceedings. The ECJ attempted to de-
fine the scope of the Directive in this regard. In Abels, it ruled that the Ac-
quired Rights Directive does not apply to transfers “where the transferor has been 
adjudged insolvent and the undertaking or business in question forms part of the asset of the 
insolvent transferor”. When the proceedings in question aim to safeguard the as-
sets of the undertaking, in view of continuing trade, the Directive does apply. 
Therefore, British courts had to decide how the principles developed in the 
judgments of the ECJ were to be applied in the context of domestic insolvency 
proceedings.  
 
3.3  Which UK insolvency proceedings are outside the scope of the 
Acquired Rights Directive and TUPE Regulations? 
 
An in-depth analysis of the insolvency regime in the UK is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. However, a brief description of the insolvency regime fol-
lows. 
The statutory insolvency regime in England and Wales was largely consoli-
dated in the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) and the accompanying statutory in-
struments. Broadly speaking, insolvency situations can be divided into liquida-
tion and alternatives to liquidation. There are three types of liquidation (com-
pulsory liquidation, members’ voluntary liquidation, and creditors’ voluntary 
liquidation) and three alternatives to liquidation (voluntary arrangement, ad-
ministration, and administrative receivership).  
 
3.3.1  Liquidations 
Liquidation involves the termination of the existence of a company. Such a 
termination can occur when the company is solvent or may be required be-
cause the company is insolvent. Liquidation may either be voluntary or re-
quired by the court.  
                                                                                                                       
bling power and would require primary legislation as contemplated by Article 7 of the Directive”. The contrary ar-
gument that the following legislation amending TUPE (Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993) 
would have confirmed the statutory authority of all the provision of TUPE itself is not entirely convincing. See also 
the approach of the House of Lord in interpreting Regulation 4 in Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co Ltd, 
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a) Court liquidations
33 
Such a type of liquidation requires an application to the court for a winding-
up petition
34. The application may be submitted by various parties (usually ei-
ther by the company, the directors, or by a creditor) in the following cases
35: 
- when a special resolution has been passed by the members of the com-
pany that the company be wound-up by the court; 
- when the company is unable to pay its debts; and 
- when the winding-up is “just and equitable”. 
After the presentation of a winding-up petition, the court may appoint a 
provisional liquidator who will usually take over the management of the com-
pany pending the winding-up order.    
b)  Voluntary liquidation
36 
Such kind of liquidation requires a shareholder’s resolution to the effect that 
the company cannot continue its business by reason of its liabilities and that it 
is advisable to wind-up
 37. 
A voluntary liquidation may be either a members’ voluntary winding-up or a 
creditors’ voluntary winding-up. In members’ voluntary winding-up, control of 
the winding-up (including the right to appoint a liquidator) remains with the 
shareholders. In creditors’ voluntary winding-up, control passes to the creditor 
(including the right to override appointment of a liquidator by the members 
and appointment of a liquidation committee to oversee the liquidator).  
A voluntary winding-up is a creditors’ voluntary winding-up unless a decla-
ration of solvency has been sworn by the directors and filed with the Compa-
nies Registry
38. A members’ voluntary winding-up may be converted to a credi-
tors’ winding-up if it later becomes apparent that the company is insolvent
39. 
In both judicial and voluntary proceedings, the essence of insolvent liquida-
tion is that the assets of the company are realized by the liquidator and distrib-
uted among the creditors. The company will cease to carry on business from 
the date of the winding-up order or resolution. The liquidator will collect the 
                                                 
33 Court liquidations are governed by Chapter VI of Part IV of the IA 1986. 
34 IA 1986, s 124. 
35 IA 1986, s 122 (1). 
36 Voluntary liquidations are governed by Chapters II to IV of Part VI of the IA 1986.   
37 Under IA 1986, s 84, the resolution can be a special resolution, an extraordinary resolution, or an ordinary resolu-
tion (only if there is a special provision in the Articles of Association to that extent). 
38 IA 1986, ss 89, 90. 
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assets of the company (which will not include assets subject to fixed or floating 
charges); creditors will prove the amount of their debts as of the time of the 
winding-up order or resolution, and the liquidator will realize the assets and 
distribute them following a certain prescribed order.  
Bearing in mind the judgments of the ECJ, the court liquidation of a com-
pany based on insolvency will be within the terms of Abels and hence outside 
the Acquired Rights Directive. There may be some doubt regarding whether a 
winding-up order is made when there is no insolvency (e.g. on the just and eq-
uitable ground in s 122.1 (g) of the IA 1986)
40. 
With regard to voluntary liquidation, there may be doubt as to whether the 
Acquired Rights Directive (and hence the TUPE Regulations) applies when the 
transferor is in a creditors’ voluntary liquidation even in the absence of a court 
order. In that case, the transferor company, although it has not been “adjudged 
insolvent”, is, in fact, insolvent. Following the reasoning of the ECJ in D’Urso, 
the lack of judicial determination to that effect would seem irrelevant. Con-
versely, it seems clear that the Directive (and therefore the TUPE Regulations) 
will apply when the transferor is in a members’ voluntary liquidation. In this 
case, the company is solvent
41 and the reasons for excluding the transfer of the 
undertaking from the scope of the Directive do not apply. The Dethier and the 
Europieces decisions support that conclusion. In Dethier, the ECJ held that the 
Directive applied in the case of a Belgian company being wound-up by the 
court in circumstances where the company continued to trade and was not 
subject to insolvency proceedings. In Europieces, the ECJ held the Directive ap-
plicable in the case of a Belgian voluntary liquidation voted upon by share-
holders. 
 
3.3.2 Alternatives to liquidation 
The three alternatives to liquidation are voluntary arrangement, administration, 
and administrative receivership.  
 
 
                                                 
40 In Charlton v Charlton Thermosystem Ltd [1995] ICR 56 at 64 the EAT referred to Abels and held that TUPE applied 
to a transfer from a dissolved company which had been struck off by the Registrar of Companies without any judi-
cial proceedings. 
41 The directors have to swear a statutory declaration of solvency and file it with the Companies Registry (sec. 89 
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a) Voluntary arrangement  
This procedure was introduced in 1986
42. A proposal must be submitted by 
the directors, a liquidator, or an administrator to a nominee. If the nominee 
agrees with the proposal, he will first file a copy with the court and then will 
call a meeting of the shareholders and creditors. If, during the meeting, the 
proposal is approved, it will bind each person who received notice of the meet-
ings and was entitled to vote
43. A supervisor will be appointed to carry out the 
voluntary arrangement.  
Clearly, this procedure does not have the characteristics of liquidation pro-
ceedings. Consequently, it must be considered as falling within the scope of the 
Directive and TUPE Regulations.  
b) Administration 
This is a new procedure introduced in 1986, and was designed to aid in the 
rescue of companies avoiding liquidation when possible
44. It is a mechanism 
used to freeze the enforcement of security or presentation of winding-up peti-
tion. Its purpose is to give the company space for further negotiations to see if 
the business can be saved without winding-up the company.  
It applies to companies which are, or are likely to become, unable to pay 
their debts. A creditor or, more commonly, the directors of the company will 
present a petition to the court. The court can appoint an administrator to take 
over the management of the company. The purposes of administration include 
the survival of the company as a going concern and the more advantageous re-
alization of the company’s assets than in a winding-up.  
Administration is only a temporary measure. If it succeeds, the company 
will be returned as a going concern or it will be followed by an arrangement 
with creditors, including a voluntary arrangement. Otherwise, the company will 
enter liquidation.   
Administration is perhaps similar to the Dutch “surseance van betaling” (or ju-
dicial leave to suspend payment of debts), which the ECJ, in Abels, held did not 
exempt a transfer from the Directive. However, following the ECJ decisions in 
D’Urso, Spano, and Dethier, it seems that any administration whose purpose in-
                                                 
42 The procedure is set out in Part I of the IA 1986 and Part I of the Insolvency Rules 1986. 
43 However, the court may overturn the proposal if it is challenged within 28 days by a creditor claiming that it will 
be unfairly prejudiced or that there has been a material irregularity (Ia 1986, s. 6). The proposal must contain savings 
for the position of unsecured creditors (IA 1986, s 4 (3)) and preferential creditors (IA 1986, s 4 (4)). 
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cludes the seeking of the survival of a business (i.e. for a purpose within s 9 (1) 
(a), (b) or (c) of the Insolvency Act 1986) will be within the Directive. An ad-
ministration for the sole purpose of the more advantageous realization of the 
company’s assets that would be effected on a winding-up (i.e. within s 9 (1) (d) 
of the Insolvency Act 1986) may be outside the Directive. 
c) Administrative Receivership 
An administrative receivership is a special type of contractual receiver ap-
pointed in relation to a company under a floating charge
45. A contractual re-
ceivership is a contractual device included within security documents (usually 
fixed and floating charges)
46. It enables the security holder – without the need 
for a court order – to appoint a receiver. The receiver will receive income and 
take charge of the management of the company which has given the security. It 
is a means of realization and enforcement of the security. 
A contractual receiver is an administrative receiver if the debenture holder 
who appointed him had a floating charge over the whole, or substantially the 
whole, of the company’s undertaking.  
The main purpose of the receiver is to recover the relevant secured amount. 
An administrative receiver typically seeks to sell part or all of the business as a 
going concern to a transferee. The transfer of assets as elements of a going 
concern in the context of such proceedings has to be distinguished from the 
transfer of assets as separate assets in the course of a liquidation proceeding. 
Such a difference has been pointed out by the Advocate General in D’Urso and 
Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir
47. The transfer of assets as a going concern 
enables the undertaking’s business to be maintained as long as possible. In this 
case, the TUPE Regulations – which must be construed in accordance with the 
Directive as interpreted by the ECJ – will apply to any eventual outside pur-
chaser. This is to the detriment of the charge holder and other creditors since 
the  receiver,  because  of  the  automatic  transfers  of  accrued  liabilities,  will 
probably realize less on the sale of the business.    
   
 
   
                                                 
45 See the definition in  IA 1986, s. 29 (2). 
46 IA 1986, ss 33-41. 
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3.4  “Hiving-down” 
 
“Hiving-down” is a process by which a liquidator, administrative receiver, or 
administrator can seek to attract a purchaser for the insolvent business and to 
facilitate the sale of the company’s undertaking. It involves the set up of new 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the insolvent parent company and the transfer of 
the ownership of the business (or the salvageable parts of it) to the subsidiary, 
while  retaining  employees  in  the  employment  of the parent  company.  The 
business of the subsidiary will be staffed by the same employees by means of 
labor supply agreements. The subsidiary will agree to pay its parents a cash 
sum for the business, but such sum will be specified under a supplemental 
agreement and will become payable on demand by the parent company. How-
ever, the parent company will not demand payment of the cash consideration 
until the subsidiary is purchased by an outside buyer. The purchaser, if one is 
found, will either buy the issued shares from the parent company or will take a 
transfer of the business from the wholly-owned subsidiary. Shortly before the 
acquisition  of  the  wholly-owned  subsidiary’s  business  by  the  outside  pur-
chaser
48, the insolvency practitioner will have dismissed the employees of the 
parent company. In the event that no purchaser is found, the company will be 
liquidated and the entire workforce dismissed on account of redundancy.  
The advantage of this process is that the receiver is able to offer the sub-
sidiary’s business for sale as a clean package, free of encumbrances such as any 
financial  claims  by  the  workforce  and  without prejudice  to  the  purchaser’s 
right to choose which employees (if any) he cares to re-employ. All liabilities 
are inherited neither by the subsidiary nor, on its eventual sale, by the outside 
purchaser. They remain with the insolvent parent company.  
According to the insolvency practitioners, the application of TUPE Regula-
tion 5 to the process of “hiving-down” would have detrimental effects. As a 
consequence of such application, the employees would be automatically trans-
ferred along with the business to the subsidiary company. Any liability for sub-
sequent dismissal would then have to be borne by the subsidiary unless the 
subsidiary was sold. In this case, the purchaser would have acquired the liabili-
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ties arising from the dismissal of employees before the sale of the subsidiary. 
In response to insolvency practitioners’ representations, the Government en-
acted TUPE Regulation 4. 
Regulation 4 provides that, when a relevant transfer is made by an insol-
vency practitioner to a wholly owned subsidiary of the insolvent company, the 
transfer  of  employment  liabilities,  under  Regulation  5,  from  the  insolvent 
company to the wholly-owned subsidiary does not take place on the transfer. It 
is postponed until either the wholly-owned subsidiary (i) ceases to be a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the insolvent company, or (ii) the relevant undertaking is 
transferred by the wholly-owned subsidiary to another person.  
The reason for such provision obviously was to give the insolvency practi-
tioner more time to arrange for dismissal of some or all of the employees be-
fore the ultimate sale to a third party took place. As long as the insolvency 
practitioner dismissed employees before the disposition of the business to the 
outside purchaser and made sure that the effective date of termination of these 
employees was before the disposition of the business, the purchaser could ac-
quire the business free of employees. Liabilities to the dismissed employees 
would remain as liabilities of the insolvent company rather than being passed 
on to the purchaser.  
The process of “hiving-down” was common in insolvency proceedings until 
the late 1980s. After the introduction of the TUPE Regulations, it has been al-
lowed by a narrow interpretation of the Regulations themselves. Regulation 3 
(1) provides for the compulsory transfer of those employed by the transferor 
“immediately before the transfer”. It was argued that those who were dismissed by 
the transferor before the transfer took place would not be caught by this rule, 
even if the dismissal preceded the transfer by only a matter of hours.  
The leading case became Secretary of State v Spence
49 in which the Court of 
Appeal appeared to hold that employees dismissed at 11 am were not trans-
ferred in a transfer which occurred at 3 pm on the same day. This interpreta-
tion of the Regulations rendered compliance with its obligation “voluntary”
50 
and provided strong economic incentives for the transferee to arrange with the 
                                                 
49 [1986] ICR 651 (CA). 
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transferor to carry out such dismissals in order to avoid or reduce costs associ-
ated with compensation for unfair dismissal and redundancy
51.  
 The decision of the House of Lords in Litster v Forth Dry Dock
52 has so se-
verely restricted the scope for dismissals prior to the sale of a hived-down sub-
sidiary as to undermine the commercial usefulness of the hiving-down practice. 
In this case, the House of Lords expressed a willingness to depart from the 
strict letter of the domestic Regulations in order to comply with the purpose of 
the Directive and the interpretation placed upon it by the European Court of 
Justice. Since the defendant in the Litster case was not an organ of the State, 
the employees could not, in light of Marshall
53, rely upon the horizontal direct 
effect of the Directive. Consequently, the House of Lords’ approach was based 
upon the interpretation of UK law in light of the European law rather than di-
rectly upon community law. The Court held that “if the legislation can rea-
sonably be construed so as to conform with those [European Community] ob-
ligations – obligations which are to be ascertained not only from the wording 
of the relevant Directive but from the interpretation placed upon it by the 
European Court of Justice at Luxembourg – such a purposive construction will 
be applied even though, perhaps, it may involve some departure from the strict 
and literal application of the words which the legislature has elected to use.”
54  
The  House  of  Lords,  departing  from  its  traditional  approach,  held  that 
community case law should control the implementation of the Directive in the 
UK, even where it meant a substantial addition to the words of the implement-
ing legislation enacted by the British Parliament. As Lord Oliver said in Litster, 
it is not “conceivable that, in framing Regulations intending to give effect to 
the Directive, the  Secretary of  State  could  have  envisaged  that  its  purpose 
should be capable of being avoided by the transparent device to which resort 
was had in the instant case.”
55 
The House of Lords closely examined Article 4 of the Directive
56. It also re-
ferred to a number of decisions of the ECJ, of which undoubtedly the most 
                                                 
51 Collins, Hugh “Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvency”  (1986) 15 ILJ 144 at 150. 
52 [1990] 1 AC 546.  
53 C-152/84 Marshall v. Southwest Hampshire AHA [1986] 1 CMLR 688.  
54 [1990] 1 AC 546 at 559, per Lord Oliver. 
55 [1990] 1 AC 546 at  576,  per Lord Oliver. 
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important was Bork
57. In that judgment, the ECJ held that “workers employed 
by the undertaking whose contract of employment or employment relationship 
has been terminated with effect on a date before that of the transfer, in breach 
of Art. 4(1) of the Directive, must be considered as still employed by the un-
dertaking on the date of the transfer with the consequence, in particular, that 
the obligations of an employer towards them are fully transferred from the 
transferor to the transferee, in accordance with Article 3 (1) of the Directive”
58. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it was clear that the previous interpretation 
of “immediately before” by the UK courts was inconsistent with the case law 
of the ECJ. The House of Lords accepted that Article 4 of the Directive im-
poses a mandatory obligation on Member States and held that, for the purpose 
of Regulation 8(1), the phrase “employed immediately before the transfer” had 
to be construed to include employees who would have been so employed at 
the time of the transfer “if they had not been unfairly dismissed in the circum-
stances described in Regulation 8(1)”.  This means that if an employee is dis-
missed prior to a transfer for a reason connected with it, he or she will be 
deemed to have been employed “immediately before the transfer”; the contract 
will be automatically transferred to the transferee and the latter will be liable 
for unfair dismissal. It is the motive for the dismissal, not the precise timing, 
which is important for the application of TUPE Regulations.  
By this decision, the House of Lords intended to restore the force of the 
Regulations by increasing the opportunities for claims against the transferee. It 
believed – no doubt correctly – that in many instances leaving the employees 
                                                 
57 Case C-101/87 [1988] ECR 3057 at 3071. 
58 However, in Litster, the House of Lords held that only pecuniary obligations with respect to the dismissed em-
ployees were transferred to the transferee, not that the employment relationship persisted as if no dismissal had 
taken place at all. The approach in Litster might be inconsistent with the ECJ decision in Bork but it is not inconsis-
tent with the wording of Art. 4 of the Directive, which states that the transfer should not constitute grounds for 
dismissal, rather than considering the dismissal without effect. Moreover, in Bork, the ECJ had accepted that na-
tional law must establish whether a contract of employment exists. Later on, in Wilson v St Helen’s Borough Council and 
Meade and Baxendale v British Fuels Limited ([1997] IRLR 505), the Court of Appeal (referring to Meade case) held that 
when an employee was dismissed for a reason connected principally with the transfer, the dismissal was a nullity and 
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to the terms and conditions of employment were unlawful. On the contrary, where (as in Wilson) dismissals were 
justified by an ETO reason, the contracts of employment did not continue and the transferee was entitled to re-
employ the staff on different terms and conditions. This pronouncement led to the bizarre result that it was not 
possible to know whether a dismissal was effective until a tribunal decided what had caused the dismissal. The 
cases, however, were appealed to the House of Lords ([1998] IRLR 706) which clarified that a dismissal, even if 
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with claims solely against the transferor would prove worthless because of the 
transferor’s insolvency
59.  
Only where dismissals prior to the transfer are motivated by reasons inde-
pendent of the transfer – such as closure of the business by reason of insol-
vency without an immediate prospect of resale
60 or because of the absence of 
any work to be performed by employees
61 – the application of Regulation 5 
will be avoided and no claims against the transferee will be permitted.  
Regulation 8(1) provides that dismissals in connection with the transfer are 
automatically unfair, unless they are for an “economic, technical or organisational rea-
son entailing changes in the workforce” (“ETO” reason). Applying the ratio of the 
Litster  decision  in  the  context  of  insolvency proceedings,  Regulation  5  will 
cover dismissals of employees during a hiving-down unless the dismissals are 
for an ETO reason
62. In light of Litster, the importance of the ETO exceptions 
in Regulation 8(2) is considerably enhanced
63.  
 
3.5  The ETO exception 
 
Regulation 8 (2) exempts employers from the rule of automatic unfair dismiss-
als when the dismissals occurred for an economic, technical, or organizational 
reason. In the context of insolvency proceedings, do dismissals intended to fa-
cilitate the prospect of a sale of the business count as an economic reason 
within Regulation 8(2)?    
                                                 
59 Collins, Hugh op. cit., n. 50 at  146. 
60 Case C-19/83  Wendleboe v L.J.Music ApS ECR 457. 
61 As in Secretary of State v. Spence [1986] ICR 651 (CA). 
62 Applying the rulings in Tsangacos v Amalgamated Chemicals Ltd ([1997] ICR 154), the EAT held that the transferee 
did not take over the liability of the transferor to an employee who had been dismissed four months before the 
transfer for a reason not connected with the transfer.   
 
63 It has to be noted that in Spano (see Chap. I), the ECJ dealt with a process described as a “technical reorganisa-
tion” but very similar to that involved in hiving-down. In fact the company transferred part of the enterprise to a 
new company, leaving the “surplus” staff with the old entity, which was then judged to be in financial difficulty. In 
all, 600 staff moved and 755 were left behind. It was argued that the remaining company, declared to be in a critical 
financial state under Italian law, was outside the scope of the Directive because of the decision in Abels (see Chap. 
I). This argument failed in this case because, under Italian law, the purpose of declaring a business to be in critical 
financial difficulties is normally a step in the direction of trying to rescue the business, in which case the Directive 
would apply. The Court failed to make any judgements on the wider issue of stripping out  the profitable parts of  a 
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Such a result occurred in Anderson v Dalkeith Engineering Ltd
64, where the 
EAT held that pre-transfer dismissals made at the request of the prospective 
purchaser  were  for  an  economic  reason  and  hence  within  Regulation  8(2). 
However this line of authority was subsequently disapproved by the EAT. In 
Wheeler v Patel
65, for instance, the EAT decided that only economic reasons 
“which relate to the conduct of business” rather than its sale or transfer satisfy Regula-
tion 8(2). A desire to achieve a sale or an enhanced price is not enough. This 
line of authority has also been followed by the Northern Ireland Court of Ap-
peal in Willis v McLaughlin & Harvey plc
66. 
A difference should be drawn between various situations in which dismiss-
als occur. 
a) Dismissal followed by an unexpected transfer of the business 
The insolvency practitioner may decide that a sale of business of the com-
pany is not likely and, accordingly, decide to dismiss an employee. If a subse-
quent transfer occurs, it is unlikely that the dismissal would be deemed to be 
connected with the transfer
67. 
b) Dismissal on demand of the potential purchaser already identified 
An insolvency practitioner may decide to dismiss one or more employees 
because the potential purchaser so requested. Such a collusive dismissal will, 
almost inevitably, be considered to be connected with the subsequent transfer. 
An authority for that can be found in Litster itself as well as in Harrison Bowden 
Ltd v Bowden 
68.  
                                                 
64 [1984] IRLR 429. 
65 [1987]  ICR 631. 
66 [1998] EuRL 22. 
67 See Spence case [1986] ICR 651 (CA). 
68 [1994] ICR 186. Mr Bowden was dismissed by the receiver on a Thursday (31 January) and subsequently re-
employed the following Monday (4 February) in preparation for the transfer which took place the following Friday 
(8 February). He was then dismissed by the transferee shortly after. The industrial tribunal held that the dismissal by 
the receiver was connected with the transfer. Indeed, the applicant had been dismissed to make the company more 
transferrable and/or transferred at a better price. Therefore, the dismissal was in direct connection with the transfer 
of the business. In the Tribunal’s view, the receiver did not dismiss the applicant because he simply could not afford 
to have the staff and then at some later date, long after the dismissal, an approach was made to buy the business. 
Instead, the dismissal and transfer were strictly connected the one to the other. At the following stage, the EAT re-
jected the argument raised by the transferee on appeal that no specific transferee had been identified by the receiver, 
and the EAT referred to the ECJ judgement in Bork where no prospective transferee had been identified at the time 
of the dismissal. In Longden and Paisley v Ferrari Limited [1994] IRLR, 157 the EAT refused to overrule the decision of 
the industrial tribunal that various employees were dismissed because of pressure on the receivers by the bank and 
not because of the proposed transfer. This was despite the fact that the purchaser had given the receivers a list of 
essential staff. A list of employees to be retained was held not to amount to a request from the transferee to dismiss 
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However, it cannot be said that a pre-transfer dismissal on demand or with the 
consent of the potential purchaser will never be for an ETO reason. Of course, 
it will be very difficult (if not impossible) to establish an ETO reason when the 
transferee subsequently re-employs the dismissed employees in the same job as 
before (as in Harrison Bowden), hires new employees, or redirects its existing 
employees  into  the  business.  Nevertheless,  the  transferred  business  might 
really  require  fewer  employees  so  that the  employees  dismissed  before  the 
transfer were genuinely redundant. This should be a valid ETO reason. As the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal recognized in Willis v McLaughlin & Harvey 
plc
69, referring to the EAT decision in Wheeler v Patel
70, a dismissal at the request 
of a purchaser can be for an ETO reason “if it can be shown that the prospec-
tive purchaser would not proceed unless the employee was dismissed. In those 
circumstances, it may be said that the employee is dismissed to enhance the 
prospects of the sale of the undertaking, but since this is necessary for the sale 
to proceed and the business could not otherwise survive, it is an economic rea-
son which entails a change in the workforce”. This line of authority has also 
been followed in Whitehouse v Blatchford & Sons Ltd
71, where the transferee had 
taken on the employees concerned and then dismissed one of them. Following 
the ECJ decision in Dethier, Warner v. Adnet
72, it was confirmed that a transferor 
may lawfully dismiss an employee for an ETO reason.  
c) Dismissals to make business more attractive to potential purchaser not yet identified 
The situation is more problematic when dismissals occur to make a business 
attractive to a potential purchaser not already identified (or, similarly, to make a 
business more efficient in view of trading out of insolvency or possible sale). 
An insolvency practitioner – acting in the interest of the insolvent company 
itself – will often seek, at some stage, to sell the company’s business as a going 
concern. He might reasonably consider that the business would be more attrac-
                                                 
69 [1998] EuLR 22. 
70 [1987] IRLR 211. 
71 [1999] IRLR 492. In this case a new contractor for hospital services took over the existing employees under 
TUPE, but then had to make one redundant because the hospital stipulated that fewer numbers of technicians were 
needed. The Court of Appeal held that this was an ETO reason.  
72 [1998] IRLR 394. In this case the administrative receivers of Adnet made Mr. Warner redundant before the sale as 
a going concern of Adnet. The Court of Appeal agreed with the industrial tribunal decision that the principal reason 
behind Mr Warner’s dismissal was an ETO one and that the dismissal was not unfair. See also Kerry Foods Ltd v Cre-
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tive to a purchaser with a slimmed down workforce. Accordingly, he will make 
various dismissals in the preparatory stage.  
Two arguments may be raised to argue that a dismissal at this stage is not 
within the scope of Regulation 8 (1) of TUPE: 
– the dismissals will form part of a general restructuring by the insolvency 
practitioner not only for the prospect of a transfer; 
– the dismissal is not connected with an identified purchaser. Regulation 8 
provides that an “employee shall be treated …  as unfairly dismissed if the 
transfer or a reason connected with it is the reason or the principle reason for 
the dismissal”. When the purchaser is not yet identified, the dismissal may be 
connected with a possible transfer, but it is not connected with the ultimate 
transfer.    
However, the wording of TUPE requires that the transfer (or a reason con-
nected with it) is the only or principal reason for the dismissal. Therefore, the 
first argument raises a subjective difficulty since it is necessary to establish 
what was in the mind of the insolvency practitioner at the time of dismissal 
(the transfer of the business or the restructuring?). 
With regard to the second argument, it has to be noted that Article 4 (1) of 
the Acquired Rights Directive is clearer than Regulation 8 in providing that “the 
transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business shall not in itself constitute grounds 
for dismissal by the transferor or the transferee”. This wording seems to be clearer in 
providing that the dismissal can be connected with any transfer, not just a spe-
cific identified transfer
73. 
It is also difficult to find any guidance in the case law. The second argument 
above was rejected by the EAT in Harrison Bowden but was accepted by a later 
EAT decision in Ibex Trading v Walton
74. In Parmar v Ferranti International plc
75, 
the EAT followed Ibex. In some other cases (as in Morris v John Grose Group 
Ltd
76), the EAT followed Harrison Bowden and not Ibex. 
                                                 
73 Pollard, David “Insolvent companies and TUPE”, (1996) 25 (3) ILJ,  191 at  202.  
74 [1994] IRLR 564. In this case, unusually, by the time it reached the EAT, the employees had decided that the 
transferor had more assets than the purchaser. Correspondingly, they argued that liability had not passed to the 
transferee. The EAT upheld the decision of the tribunal that the transferor remained liable because the dismissals 
were not for a reason connected with the transfer. 
75 (1997) 13 March (EAT 710/96) 
76 [1998] ICR 655. In this case, the EAT found that the words “the transfer” in Regulation 8 (1) could perfectly well 
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It  seems  that  the  ETO  exception  has  been  construed  narrowly  by  the 
courts. Dismissals will probably be connected with the transfer, even if they 
occur before negotiations have started with any potential purchaser. To avoid 
such a consequence, it should be shown that the principal reason was not to 
make the business more attractive for potential purchasers but, for instance, 
because  the  insolvency  practitioner  could  not  afford  to  keep  the  staff  on. 
However, it is likely that the insolvency practitioner will have more than one 
reason to dismiss employees and the potential purchaser will not be able to 
identify the principal reason for any dismissal. 
 
3.6  The balance between the acquired rights of employees and the in-
terests of other creditors 
 
The analysis of the Regulations on the transfer of undertakings and insolvency 
in the United Kingdom has raised a complex interaction between the interests 
of the employees and the interests of other creditors.  
Shortly after the adoption of the Directive, there was a clear perception of 
the existence of a number of problems in applying the Acquired Rights Direc-
tive and TUPE Regulations to insolvency situations. The essence of insolvency 
proceedings  is  that  the  assets  of  the  company  are  realized  and  distributed 
among the creditors of the company. Creditors may fall into various classes 
with some priorities among them in the satisfaction of their claims. The conse-
quence of the application of the principle of compulsory transfer of employ-
ment relationships is that the employees are treated more favorably than all 
other creditors because there is no risk of their claims not being met in full.  
Only with regard to “hiving-down”, in the possible clash between the inter-
ests of the company’s creditors and the employees’ acquired rights, was abso-
lute priority granted to the former. There was no attempt to produce even a 
compromise between the two claims. Even if hiving-down would involve dis-
missal, selective re-engagement, and an eventual modification of terms of em-
ployment of those re-engaged, it would at least create some new jobs. A pur-
chaser would not be attracted to the purchase if he had to take on all the work 
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course, is at the expense of the employees’ rights under the Acquired Rights 
Directive. 
In all other situations, British courts following the ECJ ensured that the bal-
ance between the two opposite interests was weighed in favor of protecting 
employees’ rights. However, in their evidence presented to the House of Lords 
Committee investigating changes to the Directive, the Society of Practitioners 
of Insolvency considered the transfer of undertakings legislation as “an im-
pediment to the rescue of businesses in the context of formal insolvency”. In 
view of the Practitioners, the above legislation had “the opposite from its in-
tended effect of preserving employment and employee’s rights”. The Practitio-
ners cited numerous examples of cases “where the prospect of taking over ac-
crued liabilities under employment contracts had either deterred prospective 
purchasers of insolvent businesses from dealing altogether, or had caused them 
to discount the price which they were prepared to pay”
77.  
The protectionist approach of the ECJ also led British courts to narrowly 
interpret the ETO exception. As Pollard 
78 noted, it might seem surprising that 
insolvency itself has not often been considered as a situation giving economic, 
technical, and organizational reasons justifying a change in the workforce. The 
narrow interpretation of the ETO exception is one of the reasons for the cau-
tious approach of insolvency practitioners. A prospective purchaser would not 
take the risk of invoking the ETO exception. Rather, the insolvency practitio-
ners will be very cautious and will reduce the workforce as much as possible 
before discussions and negotiations commence with prospective purchasers. 
Such an approach leads to a surprising result. As it has been pointed out, 
“the desire to reduce the risk of a connection with any subsequent transfer may 
well mean that insolvency practitioners tend to make dismissals at an earlier 
stage than they would otherwise. It is ironic that, if this occurs, the effect of 
the protective provision in TUPE will have been to reduce job security”
79. 
As Pollard 
80 concluded in 1996, the balance between the interest of em-
ployees  and  other  creditors  of the  company has not  yet  been  satisfactorily 
                                                 
77 Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 1995-96, 5th Report. 
78 Pollard, David, op. cit., n. 72 at  209. 
79 Pollard, David op. cit, n. 72 at 202. 
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struck and uncertainty could be seen as “tending to both earlier dismissals and 
less prospect of protecting jobs by way of successful business sale”.  
 
4. Business transfer and corporate insolvency in Italy 
 
4.1  Prior national law and the implementation of the Acquired Rights 
Directive in Italy. 
 
In Italy, the principle of the compulsory transfer of contracts of employment 
upon the transfer of a business was established in 1942 under Article 2112 of 
the Civil Code.  
The original version of Article 2112 was introduced as a special provision, 
derogating from the general principle of freedom of contract, with the purpose 
of protecting employees considered to be in a less favorable position (from 
economic and social points of view) with respect to the employer. The com-
pulsory transfer of contracts of employment upon the transfer was excluded 
“where the transferor had given the required notice” and employees were only 
entitled to retain  “the rights  arising  from  the  seniority  acquired  before  the 
transfer”. 
During the Italian economic crisis (1975-1980), the above regulation intro-
duced by Article 2112 appeared to be too rigid. On the one hand, Italian courts 
held collective agreements, partially derogating from the principle of compul-
sory transfer of employment relationship, effective. On the other hand, the 
Italian legislator attempted through various legislative initiatives to give priority 
to the need to ensure – as far as possible – the rescue of the business in order 
to save a certain number of jobs. While the previous version of Article 2112 
was in effect, a number of laws derogating from the principle it established 
were introduced with the purpose of excluding the application of Article 2112 
in cases of transfers by insolvent companies
81. 
                                                 
81 See Article 1 of Law. No. 218 of 1978 which allowed the transferor to exclude the effectiveness of Art. 2112 
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In 1990, Article 47 of Law No. 428 of 1990 transposed the Acquired Rights 
Directive in Italy. Article 47 amended Article 2112 of the Italian Civil Code. 
The latter, therefore, now reads as follows: 
“In the event of the transfer of an undertaking, employment relationships 
are to continue to exist with the new owner and employees’ rights under those 
relationships are to be preserved. 
  The transferor and the transferee are jointly liable for all obligations in 
respect of the employees concerned by the transfer at the time of the transfer 
itself (...)  
  The transferee shall apply the collective agreements (...) in force at the 
time of the transfer until their expiration, unless they are replaced by other col-
lective agreements applicable to the transferee’s business”. 
Article 47 also introduces a mandatory information and consulting proce-
dure with the trade unions (for undertakings with more than 15 employees) 
and expressly provides that the transfer cannot constitute in itself ground for 
dismissal of the employees.  
Since Italian legislation had already introduced special provisions in the case 
of transfers made by insolvent companies, when Article 47 came into force, it 
– unlike the UK TUPE Regulations – provided, in paragraph (5), for deroga-
tion from Article 2112 of the Italian Civil Code in the case of insolvent busi-
ness transfers.  
 
4.2    Article 47(5) of Law No. 428 of 1990 
 
Article 47(5) of Law No. 428 of 1990 refers to different situations:  
a)  undertakings declared by the CIPI to be facing critical difficulties, pursuant 
to Article 2 (5) (c ) of Law No. 675 of 12 August  1977; and  
b)  undertakings subject to an insolvency procedure properly so called, namely 
either  (i)  declared  bankrupted,  or (ii)  subject  of  an  approved  creditors’  ar-
rangement and composition consisting in the disposal of assets, or (iii) subject 
to a compulsory administrative winding-up procedure which has been pub-
lished, or (iv) subject to a special administration procedure, if no provision has 
been made for the continuation of the business or it has been finished. Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    35
In these situations, it provides that “if the consultation referred to in the fore-
going  paragraphs  (with  the  employees’  representatives)  has  resulted  in  any 
agreement which provides for the maintenance of employed personnel, even in 
part, Article 2112 of the Civil Code shall not, unless the agreement lays down 
more favorable conditions, apply to the employees whose employment rela-
tionship continues with the transferee. Such an agreement may additionally 
provide that surplus personnel are to be excluded from the transfer and that 
the latter are to continue, wholly or in part, in the service of the transferor”.  
 
4.3.  Undertakings which have been declared to be facing critical diffi-
culties pursuant to Article 2 (5) (c) of Law No. 675 of 1977. 
 
Pursuant to Article 47(5), in the case of undertakings declared by the CIPI to 
be facing critical difficulties, it is sufficient that the mandatory consultation of 
the workforce result in an agreement providing for the continued employment 
of personnel, even in part, in order to exclude the application of Article 2112 
of Civil Code. Article 47 (5) is intended to facilitate the transfer of an undertak-
ing facing critical difficulties where there is a collective agreement on even the 
partial maintenance of employment. The transferee, in fact, will have the ad-
vantage of taking only those employees necessary to carry out the business. In 
turn, the transferor can proceed (immediately or later) to make reductions in 
the workforce. The transferor can also continue to make use of the remaining 
employees or, alternatively, can temporarily suspend their employment. In the 
latter case, the suspended employees will continue to have part of their wages 
guaranteed for a period of twelve months by the Government.  
A finding by the CIPI that the undertaking is facing critical difficulties is 
conditional primarily and above all on circumstances relating to social policy 
rather than to the economic and financial situation of the undertaking in ques-
tion, as in the case of insolvency proceedings. In order to be declared in critical 
difficulties, the undertaking is required to submit a restructuring program. The 
aim of that procedure is thus not to liquidate the debtor’s assets, as in insol-
vency proceedings. Any transfer of an undertaking in critical difficulties takes 
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The act by which an undertaking is declared to be in critical difficulties aims to 
enable the debtor undertaking to deal with temporary difficulties providing the 
workers with financial support for as long as those difficulties persist. The 
most important consequence of the declaration that the undertaking is in criti-
cal difficulties is that employees qualify for registration under the Cassa Inte-
grazione Guadagni – Gestione Straordinaria (Special Department of the Wage 
Supplement Fund hereinafter referred to as “CIGS”). Under the CIGS system, 
employment relationships of all or part of the workforce are totally, or in part, 
suspended, and payment to workers of part of their remuneration is guaran-
teed by the CIGS.  
Under the regime for undertakings in critical difficulties, no provision is 
made for judicial supervision at the initiation or in the course of the procedure, 
no suspension of payment is provided, nor are the debtor’s powers to deal 
with and manage its assets removed.  
It is clear that the procedure in question did not have the characteristics of 
nor entailed consequences comparable with those of the procedures recog-
nized by the ECJ (in Abels and D’Urso) as falling outside the scope of the Di-
rective.  However,  Italian  judges,  rather  than  merely  making  use  of  the  ap-
proach outlined by the ECJ in previous judgements on similar or related issues, 
“seem to have felt the necessity to ask for the support of the ECJ in order to 
obtain confirmation of the applicability of the ECJ’s previous decisions to the 
specific Italian situation”
82.  
The Italian Court, which made reference to the ECJ, recognized the possi-
ble clash between Article 47 (5) of Law No. 428 of 1990 and community law. 
The ECJ excluded the application of the Directive only when the transferor 
was subject to a proceeding aimed at the liquidation of the undertaking and the 
realization of its assets. Article 47 (5) of Italian Law No. 428 of 1990 equated 
such proceedings with the status of critical difficulties. That was unlikely to be 
compatible with the Directive. Undertakings in critical difficulties are in a state 
of serious indebtedness but their financial situation is manifestly less grave 
than that of an undertaking subject to bankruptcy proceedings. The business 
of an undertaking in critical difficulties is taken over by the transferee without 
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any significant hiatus in production and, above all, with real prospects of re-
covery.  
The ECJ, following its previous judgements, held that the Directive was ap-
plicable to the transfer of an undertaking which, under Article 2(5) (c) of Ital-
ian Law No. 675 of 1977, had been declared to be in critical difficulties. This 
was because an undertaking declared to be in critical difficulties is subject to a 
procedure aimed at the continuation of the business rather than its liquidation.  
The Court did not even take into account Article 4 of the Directive and Ar-
ticle 47(4) of Law No. 428 of 1990. These provisions state that the transfer will 
not constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or the transferee but ex-
pressly exempt dismissals relating to economic, technical, and organizational 
reasons which entail changes in the workforce. These reasons always occur in 
the restructuring of undertakings in critical difficulties. 
The ECJ’s judgement in Spano has raised some doubts among Italian aca-
demic writers. As it has been noted, rules governing undertakings in critical dif-
ficulties constitute an autonomous regulatory system in respect to other insol-
vency proceedings. Indeed, they aim to protect collective and not individual in-
terests while Article 2112 of Civil Code focuses on the individual rights of em-
ployees.  A  different treatment of  undertakings  in  critical  difficulties  would, 
therefore, be justified on the basis of preserving jobs, which is the aim of such 
proceedings. Article 2112 of Civil Code and Article 47 (5) of Law 428 of 1990 
would deal with different situations
83.  
It also seemed that the ECJ was extremely concerned about the risk of a 
broad interpretation of the concept of undertakings in critical difficulties by 
domestic courts. However, Article 1 of law No. 223 of 1991 required the CIPI 
to establish, in advance, the requirements for an undertaking being declared in 
critical difficulties. This has substantially reduced the discretionary powers of 






                                                 
83 See Boscati, “Il trasferimento di aziende in crisi al vaglio della Corte di Giustizia”, (1996) 6, Lav. Giur, p. 460 at 
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4.4   Undertakings subject to insolvency proceedings 
 
Art. 47 (5) refers to several insolvency proceedings under Italian law: (i) bank-
ruptcy proceedings properly so-called (“fallimento”); (ii) approved preventive 
arrangements  and  compositions  (“concordato  preventivo”);  (iii)  compulsory 
administrative  winding-up  procedure  (“liquidazione  coatta  amministrativa”); 
and (iv) special administration procedure (“amministrazione straordinaria”). 
Following the ECJ’s reasoning in D’Urso, Art. 47 (5), with regard to under-
takings subject to insolvency proceedings, expressly states that the derogation 
from Art. 2112 of Civil Code can only operate when not only (i) the mandatory 
consultation of the workforce has resulted in an agreement providing for the 
continued employment of personnel, even in part, but also (ii) no decision to 
continue trading has been taken with regard to the transferor company or it 
has already ceased trading.  
Bankruptcy  proceedings  and  compulsory  administrative  winding–ups  are 
outside the scope of the Directive as interpreted by the ECJ. Some doubts 
might arise in the case of approved preventive arrangement and composition. 
However, this exemption from the application of Art. 2112 of Italian Civil 
Code might be considered as falling under Art. 4a (3) of the Amending Direc-
tive. This article states that, where the transferor is in a situation of serious 
economic crisis declared by a competent public authority under domestic pro-
visions already existing in national law by July 17, 1998, a Member State may 
allow agreements between the transferee, the transferor, and employees’ repre-
sentatives with the aim of introducing alterations to the employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment.  
Article 47 (5), however, also includes in its scope the special administration 
procedure, which has different characteristics from those of the other proceed-
ings mentioned in the same provision and which, before the introduction of 
Art. 47 (5), was the object of a preliminary ruling referenced to the ECJ by the 
Pretore di Milano in D’Urso.  
In D’Urso, the Pretore di Milano raised the question of the compatibility of 
Art. 3 of Law No. 19 of 1987 which provides that, in the event of transfers of 
businesses or parts of businesses in the implementation of programs for under-
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The Italian court referred to the ECJ the question of whether the Acquired 
Rights Directive was applicable to transfers of businesses made by undertak-
ings under special administration.  
The Court, recalling the principles developed in the earlier case of Abels, 
concluded that the Directive did not apply to transfers made by undertakings 
subject to a special administration, unless the continued activity of the business 
was envisaged and the business was still actually trading.  
Following the preliminary reference in D’Urso and the infringement pro-
ceedings begun by the Commission against Italy with regard to Art. 3 of Law 
No. 19 of 1987, the Italian legislature passed Law No. 428 of 1990, which 
amended Art. 2112 of Civil Code as stated above.   
Special administration was introduced by Law No. 95 of 1979. It applies (to 
the exclusion of cases of bankruptcy) to large undertakings
85. In order to apply 
the procedure, it is necessary that the judicial authorities (on their own initia-
tive, or on the application of the undertaking itself, of the creditors, or of the 
Public Prosecutor) have declared the undertaking to be in a state of insolvency 
or to have failed to pay salaries for a period of three months.  
The procedure is set in motion by ministerial decree and conducted by one 
or three auditors, appointed and supervised by ministerial authority. Subject to 
any contrary provision in Law No. 95 of 1979 itself, the special administration 
procedure is governed by the provision of Italian law on the compulsory ad-
ministrative winding-up of undertakings.  As a consequence, the organs of the 
undertaking cease their functions and lose their power to manage the undertak-
ing and dispose of its assets. 
The ministerial decree may allow the undertaking to continue to trade under 
the supervision of the auditor for a period not exceeding two years (which can 
be extended two times for a total period not exceeding a further two years). 
The auditor draws up a program which contains, as far as possible and taking 
into account the interests of creditors, a restructuring plan. The plan identifies 
the plants to be brought back into operation and those which must be trans-
ferred. The State may guarantee debts incurred vis-à-vis credit institutions in 
order to finance the day-to-day running.  
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The ECJ, in D’Urso, held that the Acquired Rights Directive did not apply 
unless it has been decided that the undertaking is to continue trading. As in 
Spano, the judgment of the ECJ in D’Urso has been criticized by a number of 
Italian academic writers
86.  
It has been noted that special administration is very akin to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. As stated in the preamble to Law No. 95 of 1979, the purpose of the 
special administration procedure is to save parts of the undertaking concerned 
which are basically sound by transferring ownership of the undertakings – but 
not its debts – from the insolvent transferor to a transferee. As in bankruptcy 
proceedings, the process is based on the inability to meet liabilities and in-
volves the transfer of assets.  
 Before the decision to commence the procedure is taken by ministerial de-
cree, the court must first have declared a state of insolvency or failure to pay 
salaries. As in bankruptcy proceedings, a large public control is exercised over 
the commencement and course of the procedure. The only difference is that, 
while in bankruptcy proceedings it is the court that exercises such power of 
control, in special administration this supervision is exercised by an administra-
tive authority. However, in a special administration procedure, a judicial inter-
vention is also necessary in the first stage. The conduct of the procedure is su-
pervised by an administrative authority because the restructuring of a large un-
dertaking with a view to transferring a set of assets and maintaining jobs re-
quires policy choices which can be better made by an administrative rather 
than a judicial authority.   
The powers of disposal and management of the debtor subject to a special 
administration proceeding are similar to those of companies in liquidation. In-
deed, Law No. 95 of 1979 expressly refers to bankruptcy legislation on com-
pulsory administrative liquidation. This means that the debtor loses all powers 
of disposition and management, which are transferred to the auditor or audi-
tors.  
On the basis of the foregoing, the special administration procedure should 
have been treated as a bankruptcy proceeding even if the undertaking under 
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special administration had been authorized to continue trading. Such authorisa-
tion is merely incidental.  
On several occasions, the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte Costituzionale”) 
has held the special administration procedure analogous to compulsory admin-
istrative winding-up
87 and recognized that the effects, in respect to creditors, 
are the same in special administration, bankruptcy, and compulsory administra-
tive winding-up
88. All those similarities have been ignored by the ECJ, which, 
instead, extended as much as possible the scope of the Directive, although it 
entailed detrimental effects for employees
89. 
Moreover, declaring the Directive inapplicable where trading ceases and ap-
plicable when the undertaking continues trading may lead to the consequence 
of immediate termination of trading, although this could be a less favorable so-
lution from a social point of view. If special administration was not to be 
treated in a way analogous to bankruptcy proceedings, then debtors would seek 
application of the bankruptcy proceeding, instead of a special administration 
procedure, in order to escape the application of the Directive. This would be 
detrimental to the workers since only the special administration procedure, and 
not bankruptcy proceedings, aims to preserve jobs. 
 
4.6   The “direct” approach of Italian courts 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Acquired Rights Directive has been transposed 
into domestic law with remarkable lack of enthusiasm because of the difficul-
ties in accommodating the new principle of compulsory transfer of the em-
ployment relationship with the traditional principle of freedom of contract and 
the practice of hiving-down. A first attempt was made to rely on a narrow in-
terpretation of the 1981 Regulations. However, UK courts, after some initial 
hesitation and confusion, have given the Directive and the TUPE Regulations 
very wide application. British courts expressly applied the ECJ judgements to 
the national situation without feeling the need to make express reference for 
preliminary rulings to the ECJ. They have easily accepted the supremacy of EC 
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law and have applied the principles developed by the ECJ with positive enthu-
siasm. It has been suggested that the absence of a written constitution and Bill 
of Rights as well as a Constitutional Court to protect them might have facili-
tated the application of EC law and ECJ principles in the UK
90.  
Moreover, UK courts also had the advantage of the prior domestic law be-
ing based on the opposite principle of freedom of contract in respect to the 
Directive, so once the new principle of compulsory transfer of employment re-
lationship upon the transfer of business had been accepted, the UK courts 
could apply it without any concern of compatibility with previously existing 
domestic laws.  
In Italy, the compulsory transfer of the employment relationship upon the 
transfer of a business was a traditional principle of domestic labor law. Since 
the late 1970s, Italian legislation has exempted transfers of undertakings by in-
solvent transferors from the application of the principle of compulsory transfer 
in the case of insolvent companies. At first sight, the task of the Italian courts 
should  have  been  easier  than  that  of the  UK  courts.  However,  the  Italian 
courts faced the problem of potential conflict between pre-existing domestic 
laws and the case law of the European Court. Because of those difficulties, 
Italian courts made a number of references to the ECJ for preliminary rulings.  
As an unexpected consequence, the British courts, without making express 
reference to the ECJ, put a heavy burden on the ECJ itself to give effective 
guidance to national courts, being at the same time free to adjust the ECJ rea-
soning, expressly made with reference to different domestic laws, to the na-
tional legislation. In contrast, Italian courts, by making a number of references 
for preliminary rulings to the ECJ, apparently seemed to turn the task of giving 
guidance to the national courts over to the ECJ. However, they had the reverse 
effect to be strictly bound by the ECJ rulings. In those judgements, as in Spano 
and D’Urso, the European Court did not take into account the peculiar charac-
teristics of undertakings facing critical difficulties or subject to special admini-
stration under relevant Italian provisions, and simply applied the principles de-
veloped in its previous case law.   
 
                                                 
90 See Davies, Paul  “The European Court of Justice, National Courts and the Member States” in DAVIES, LYON-
CAEN, SCIARRA and SIMITIS, European Community Labour Law (Oxford, 1996) 124-125.  Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    43
5. The amendment of the Acquired Rights Directive 
 
5.1  The revision process 
 
Criticisms of the Acquired Rights Directive and the protectionist approach 
adopted by the ECJ – whose decisions rendered the Directive even more con-
troversial – led to a long and difficult process of revision of the 1977 Directive.  
The Commission put forward proposals for the revision of the Acquired 
Rights  Directive  in  1994.  A  revised  draft  was  published  in  1997  following 
heavy  criticism  of  the  initial  proposals  by  the  European  Parliament
91.  The 
amending Directive was finally adopted on June 29, 1998
92. The Amending Di-
rective inserts new Articles 1-7b into the 1977 Directive. The new Directive 
does not seek to radically alter the scope and purpose of the original Directive, 
but instead seeks to consolidate the case law of the ECJ. 
One  notable  aspect  of  the  Directive  is  the  flexibility  it  offers  Member 
States. On a number of key issues (including its application in insolvency situa-
tions), Member States are granted the option of applying the Directive. While it 
is true that the original Directive also gave the Member States certain options, 
that text did not have the same degree of flexibility which characterizes the 
new Directive. The new approach adopted by the Council of the European 
Community is an example of the subsidiarity principle in action, and it also ex-
emplifies the Community’s current “light touch” approach to labor legislation 
in general.  
 
5.2   Insolvent transferors 
 
It is in relation to transfers by an insolvent transferor that the Amending Di-
rective has effected the greatest changes. This is also the area in which the 
Amending Directive gives the greatest number of legislative choices to Mem-
ber States. 
Articles 4(1) and 4(2) have not changed: a transfer shall not constitute grounds 
for dismissal of an employee but dismissals may take place for economic, tech-
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nical, or organizational reasons entailing changes in the workforce; Member 
States may exclude from that rule employees who are not covered by domestic 
protection against dismissal; and if, by reason of the transfer, the contract of 
employment is terminated because there is a substantial change in working 
conditions to the detriment of the employee, the employer is regarded as re-
sponsible for that termination.  
However, there is a new Article 4a. The Amending Directive, unfortunately, 
adopts the distinction drawn in the case law of the ECJ between the liquidation 
of insolvent companies and other ways of dealing with them. It permits Mem-
ber States to exclude the application of the Directive in cases where the under-
taking, business, or part of the business being transferred “is the subject of 
bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceeding which have 
been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor and 
are under the supervision of a competent public authority”
93. 
The difficulty with this distinction is that “it focuses on the ultimate fate of 
the transferor, rather than on the position of the employees and the transferee 
when the viable parts of the business are sold, something that is a central fea-
ture of any procedure for handling insolvencies, whether through liquidation 
or otherwise”
94. 
As a result of such distinction, practitioners will have an incentive to adopt 
the liquidation procedure instead of other proceedings aimed at rescuing the 
undertakings. The effect will be quite the opposite of the Directive’s purpose 
to protect employment. 
The ability to exclude insolvent undertakings from the scope of the Direc-
tive is optional. It is for the Member States to decide. Therefore, Member 
States  which  do not  take  it  up  will  be  seen  as  including  such  insolvencies 
within the scope of the Directive.  
Under Article 4a (2), irrespective of the choice made in relations to liquida-
tions, the Member States may provide that the transferor’s debts (either in the 
form of arrears of payments, damages, or other liabilities) due before the busi-
ness transfer or prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings do not pass to 
the transferee. The use of the word "debts" in the new provision is significant; 
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the word used in Article 3(1) is "obligations", suggesting that it is only accrued 
and liquidated amounts which may be excluded from transfer, such as arrears 
of wages and salary or accrued holiday pay.  
However, Member States wishing to take advantage of such a provision 
must be in compliance with the Insolvency Directive
95. That Directive requires 
Member  States  to  guarantee  employees'  pay  for  specified  periods  in  cases 
where the employer is insolvent. Member States are permitted to set a ceiling 
on the liability for employees' claims. Unless the above option is taken up, the 
principle of compulsory transfer of the contract of employment will entail the 
transfer of the above liabilities.  
This option has been considered as “simply a wealth transfer from the employees to 
the creditors of the transferor”
96. Since the undertaking is free of debts arising from 
the contracts of employment, the transferor will be able to sell it at a higher 
price for the benefits of its creditors. The requirement of compliance with the 
Insolvency Directive does not help since the level of protection guaranteed by 
this Directive is notoriously low
97.  
 
5.3  Variation of terms and conditions of employment upon the transfer 
of an insolvent company 
 
In addition to, or instead of, the first option under Article 4 a (2), Member 
States can opt to allow the employer’s and employees’ representatives to agree 
to alterations in the employees’ terms and conditions of employment “designed 
to safeguard employment opportunities by ensuring the survival of the undertaking”. The 
agreement modifies the principle of the compulsory transfer of employment 
on the workers’ existing terms and conditions. Such a modification was firmly 
rejected by the ECJ
98 and UK courts while, in Italy, it was a commonly ac-
cepted principle.  
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As highlighted by Shrubsall
99, the UK Court of Appeal decision in Wilson v St 
Helens Borough Council and Meade & Baxendale v British Nuclear Fuels 
100 estab-
lished that, if there is a transfer of an undertaking and employees are trans-
ferred, their terms of service cannot be varied lawfully for a reason connected 
to the transfer, even if the employees consent to the variation and, it seems, re-
gardless of how long after the transfer the variation is made. In reaching that 
decision, the Court of Appeal purported to follow the decision of the ECJ in 
Daddy's Dance Hall
101. In this case, it was held that a worker could not waive the 
rights conferred upon him by the mandatory provisions of the Directive, even 
if the disadvantages were offset by advantages so that, overall, he would not be 
left  in  a  worse  position.  However,  the  ECJ  did  not  prevent  variations  by 
agreement between the parties in cases where the reason is unconnected to the 
transfer
102.  
Wilson  and  Meade  endorsed  the  principle  that  the  validity  of  downward 
variation of terms hinges on whether or not that variation is for a reason con-
nected with the transfer. Lord Slynn thought that the tribunal and the Court of 
Appeal in Wilson were entitled to find that the transfer of the undertaking was 
not the reason for the variation and so the variation would have been effective 
even without the dismissals. In Meade, there was no such finding but, since the 
dismissals were effective and the employees had received substantial compen-
sation for loss of employment, they were free to agree to re-engagement terms 
with the transferee employer. There was no variation, but a dismissal and re-
engagement
103.  
As clearly highlighted by Shrubsall “the House of Lords judgment did not 
resolve the conundrum that if it is not lawful for the transferee of an undertak-
ing to negotiate consensual variation in the terms of employment of the exist-
ing workforce as part of a transfer, a business which is in financial difficulties, 
but which might be saved by re-organization, cannot be rescued”, so that “the 
result might be that the undertaking is forced into closure and all jobs are lost: 
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the consequence of an interpretation of a Directive which was meant to pro-
tect jobs. The employer can dismiss and re-engage on different terms, but if he 
does and the defense of economic, technical, or organizational reason is not 
made out, he will incur liability in an unfair dismissal”
104.  
The new Article 4a provides a partial solution. Article 4a paragraph 2(b) 
permits Member States to provide that, on a transfer during such insolvency 
proceedings, employees' representatives may agree to alterations in the em-
ployees' terms and conditions of employment "designed to safeguard employ-
ment opportunities by ensuring the survival of the undertaking". Like the Ital-
ian legislator, the Council of the European Communities opted for a collective 
protection of employees’ rights. In other words, if some individuals may be 
considerably worse off as a result of the agreement, the latter will nevertheless 
benefit the employees as a whole. Concerns have been expressed about the 
great degree of flexibility and bargaining power which may arise from this pro-
vision for the employer
105. As a response to those concerns, Art. 4a(4) of the 
Directive states that “Member States shall take appropriate measures with a 
view to preventing misuse of insolvency proceedings in such a way as to de-
prive employees of the rights provided for in this Directive”. 
However, the new provision allows for negotiated and consensual variation 
only in cases where the undertaking is already the subject of insolvency pro-
ceedings and the purpose must be to ensure the survival of the business. Arti-
cle 4a (3) contains a special provision allowing one Member State – which, like 
Italy, already has special national procedures to promote the survival of com-
panies declared to be in a state of economic crisis – to agree to the alteration of 
employment terms in such cases.   
   
5.4  The impact of the Amending Directive on employees’ rights and 
the process of transposition in the UK and Italy 
 
Although the Amending Directive introduces welcome clarifications with re-
gard to the transfers of undertakings in the context of insolvency proceedings, 
there are many gray areas. The Amending Directive adopted the distinction 
                                                 
104 Shrubsall, “Employment Rights and Business Transfers - Changes to the Acquired Rights Directive”, op. cit.. 
105 Hardy, Stephen – Painter, Richard W, “The new Acquired Rights Directive and its Implications for European 
Employees Relations in the Twenty-First Century”, (1996)  6 (4) MaastJECL. 366 at  378.  G. SIGILLÒ MASSARA  48
drawn by the ECJ between insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings. The 
EU Commission did not take the opportunity to give more general application 
to the principle of collectively agreed upon variation in the terms and condi-
tions of employment. The Amending Directive allows such variations only in 
the context of insolvent business transfers. Finally, in the interest of certainty, 
it does not indicate, as suggested by the House of Lords in 1996 and so far as it 
was practicable, the insolvency procedures of each Member State to which the 
Directive applies
106.  
Moreover, the flexibility which characterizes the new Directive has raised 
different comments.  It has been argued that the Amending Directive does lit-
tle to advance the cause of employment protection in the context of insolvency 
proceedings since it gives EU Member States a wide degree of discretion in 
terms  of  the  type  and  strength  of  protection  to  offer
107.  In  contrast,  Ian 
McCartney, Minister of State at the UK Department of Trade and Industry, as-
serted that the Amending Directive “will help competitiveness and employment flexibil-
ity, by helping the labour market to adapt to structural change in the economy without walk-
ing over the rights of employees”
108. 
There is no doubt that the Amending Directive has the effect of reducing 
employees’ formal legal entitlement. Whether, in turn, employees can expect to 
enjoy  greater  substantive  job  protection  is  an  issue  not  yet  resolved.  The 
changes in the area of insolvency are essentially deregulatory and their ultimate 
impact will depend heavily on the choices made by the Member States at the 
point of implementation
109. However, the transposition process of the Amend-
ing Directive into domestic law has, so far, been very slow if the deadline for 
the transposition was July 17, 2001.  
In the meantime, on March 12, 2001, the Council of European Communi-
ties adopted Directive 2001/23/EC
110 which simply codifies – in the interests 
of clarity and rationality
111 – the amendments to the Acquired Rights Directive 
by the Amending Directive. However, Directive 2001/23/EC does not preju-
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dice the time limits within which the Member States are to comply with the 
Amending Directive.  
 
Recently, the legal debate regarding the compliance of the Italian labor law or-
der with the second generation directives on the transfer of overtakings has 
seen a complex dialogue involving statutory and judicial interventions. In par-
ticular, the Italian Legislation enacted three Legislative Decrees regarding this 
institute (Legislative Decree No. 18/2001; Legislative Decree No. 276/2003, 
Articles No. 29, paragraphs 3 and 32, Legislative Decree No. 251/2007, Article 
No. 9) and, on the other side, the European Court of Justice delivered many 
important judgments that witnessed the evolution of the transfer of undertak-
ings discipline
112. Furthermore, Italian Corte di Cassazione committed itself to 
a long-distance dialogue with ECJ case law in an attempt to apply Italian law in 
full compliance with the principles of the previously indicated Directives as 
well as with the related interpretation established by the ECJ
113. 
It should be highlighted that the indicated Decrees do not contain any pro-
vision amending the previous regime of transfer of insolvent companies.  In 
fact, Legislative Decree No. 18/2001 only amends Article 47, paragraphs (1) 
(2) (3) and (4) of Law No. 428 of 1990, but does not refer to paragraph (5) 
which, as discussed in Chapter III, exempts insolvent business transfers from 
the scope of Art. 2112 of Italian Civil Code. Article 47 (5) must be considered 
to still be in force. 
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As indicated before, some authors
114 expressed doubts regarding the compati-
bility of this provision with the Directive 77/187, and, after the Spano judge-
ment, Italian doctrine divided itself in two currents of thoughts in defining the 
consequences of the same judgement. 
Some authors
115 affirmed that the relevant Directive, as interpreted by ECJ, 
should  prevail  on  Article  47,  paragraph  (5),  of  Law  No.  428/1990,  which 
should therefore cease to be applied. Others, on the contrary, noted that the 
directive could not have any direct efficacy for individual relationships, so the 
indicated national provision should be applied to further legislative reform
116. 
This reconstruction was used by the Corte di Cassazione in the New Holland 
Italia case
117, in which the Corte affirmed that the non-compliance of the na-
tional rule with the relevant Directive, under the interpretation offered by the 
ECJ in the Spano case, cannot preclude the application of Article 47, para-
graph 5, not only because the original Directive could not have been enforced 
in private relationships, but also because, in the opinion of the Corte,  there 
was no space for a restrictive interpretation of the national law. Furthermore, 
some Authors has highlighted the possibility of the workers bringing an action 
against the State for the possible non-application of Article 47, paragraph (5), 
of Law No. 428/1990
118. However, as indicated before, the Directive 98/50, in 
Article  4-bis,  paragraph  3  (now  Article  5,  paragraph  3,  of  the  Directive 
2001/23) states that  “a Member State may apply paragraph 2(b)
119 to any 
transfer where the transferor is in a situation of serious economic crisis, as de-
fined by national law, provided that the situation is declared by a competent 
public authority and open to judicial supervision, on the condition that such 
provisions already existed in national law on July 17, 1998”. As indicated by the 
                                                 
114Ex plurimis DE LUCA, “Salvaguardia dei diritti dei lavoratori in caso di trasferimento d’azienda: funzione del diritto 
comunitario e della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia nella interpretazione e nell’applicazione della nuova discipli-
na nazionale”, Foro It., IV, 288 
115  LAMBERTUCCI (1996), “La disciplina del trasferimento d’azienda in crisi al vaglio della Corte di Giustizia”,  Rivista 
italiana di diritto del lavoro, II, p. 274. 
116 SANTORO PASSARELLI (2005), “Il trasferimento di parte dell’azienda tra libertà dell’imprenditore e tutela dei lavoratori”, AA.VV. 
“Dialoghi tra dottrina e giurisprudenza, p. 28. 
117 Cass., Sez. Lav.  21.3.2001, n. 4073, (2001), I, Foro it.,,3 235, with a note by Cosio.  
118 PELAGGI (1998), “Trasferimento d’azienda nelle imprese in crisi, potere di recesso del cedente e del cessionario ed 
effetti del licenziamento illegittimo alla luce della giurisprudenza comunitaria”, Massimario di Giurisprudenza del Lavoro, p. 
628. 
119 Which states that: “The transferee, transferor or person or persons exercising the transferor's functions, on the one 
hand, and the representatives of the employees on the other hand may agree alterations, in so far as current law or 
practice permits, to the employees' terms and conditions of employment designed to safeguard employment opportu-
nities by ensuring the survival of the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business”. Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    51
last clause, this rule, for a part of the doctrine
120, aims directly to provide a so-
lution to all previous uncertain situations, as if, in a certain sense, the rule itself 
would have been enacted in order to legitimate the peculiar Italian regime of 
transfer  of  undertakings  in  crisis  that  would  remain  fully  operable.  Some 
doubts regarding the consistency of the Italian law, even with the second gen-
eration directive, still persist, especially in light of the recent European Court 
of  Justice  case  law.  In  fact,  the  ECJ,  in  Case  145/01  (Commission  of  the 
European Communities v. Italian Republic)
121, the Court, in an obiter dictum, 
affirmed that Article 47(5) and (6) of Law No. 428/1990 (…) may well, at least 
partially, correspond to the situations contemplated in Article 4a”. In other 
words, it seems that the Court would state only a partial legitimation of Article 
47, paragraph 5, of Law No. 428/1990.  
Which is then the legitimate space of operability of the national provision? 
It appears possible to affirm that Article 47 could be legitimately applied con-
sistently with the Directive only in the case of a “serious economic crisis” that 
would  lead  the  overtaking  to  a  pre-liquidation  status.  This  reconstruction 
seems to be coherent with the text of Directive 2001/23 and, most relevantly, 
with the ECJ case law connected to the enforcement of the first generation Di-
rective (77/187), which excluded its operability if the purpose of the procedure 
was the liquidation of the whole business. 
But what is the fate of the other profiles of the national rule that do not 
comply with the Directive? The problem is the question concerning the hori-
zontal direct efficacy of self-executing directives. The exclusion of any hori-
zontal direct effect is affirmed constantly by the ECJ. In the famous judgment 
Faccini Dori
122, it has been stated that “as the Court has consistently held since 
its judgment in Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hamp-
shire Health Authority [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48, a directive cannot of it-
self impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as 
such against an individual” and that “the effect of extending that case law to 
the sphere of relations between individuals would be to recognize a power in 
                                                 
120 MENGHINI (2000), “L’attenuazione delle tutele individuali dei lavoratori in caso di trasferimento d’azienda in crisi o 
soggetta a procedure concorsuali dopo la direttiva 50/98 e il d.lgs. 270/99”, Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della previdenza so-
ciale, p. 229; LAMBERTUCCI (1999), “Le tutele del lavoratore nella circolazione dell’azienda”, Giappichelli, Torino, pp. 74 - 75; 
VILLANI (2000), Trasferimento d'azienda. Profili di diritto del lavoro e della previdenza sociale, Utet, Torino pp. 174 - 175.  
C-145/01, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, [2003] ECR 5581, par. 16. 
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the  Community  to  enact  obligations  for  individuals  with  immediate  effect, 
whereas it has competence to do so only where it is empowered to adopt regu-
lations”. Nor does it appear possible to  recognize an “indirect” horizontal ef-
fect  to the Directives,  considering  that  in  the  Marleasing  judgement
123,  the 
Court clearly stated that this peculiar effectiveness would be possible only in 
the case of “soft interpretation” and not in the case of “hard interpretation”, 
the first defined as an operation in which the judge attributes meanings consis-
tent with European law to ambiguous legislative texts, the second defined as 
the enforcement of a meaning which is different from the one directly emerg-
ing from the legal text, which is performed in order to define an interpretation 
which is systematically consistent with European law. As a matter of fact, it 
must be remembered that the full adaptation of Italian law to the European 
provisions always remains a legislative operation, and cannot be judicially im-
plemented.  
In conclusion, the part of Article 47, paragraph 5, of Law No. 428/1990 
that appears to remain non-compliable with the second generation directive 
will continue to be enforced in the Italian legal order, considering, as above, 
that the transfer of undertaking Directive cannot be directly enforced in the 
individual relationship and that a “hard interpretation” does not appear legiti-
mate. 
 
5.6  The transposition process in the UK
124 
 
The enactment of the second generation Directives determined an amendment 
of the TUPE regulation (SI 2006/246). In particular, the new TUPE regulation 
applies to a transfer of an undertaking, business, or part thereof where there is 
a transfer of an “economic entity”, which is defined as “an organised grouping 
of resources which has the objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether 
or not the activity is central or ancillary”
125. For most businesses, deploying 
mixed resources to further commercial activity, the test for application of the 
regulation is whether the commercial activity, together with the sufficiency of 
the resources deployed, passes from the transferor to the transferee so that the 
                                                 
123 C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA , [1990] ECR 1839. 
124 SHRUBSALL (2006), “The New TUPE Regulation”, New Law Journal, p. 584.   
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entity is recognizable in the hands of the transferee. As indicated by Shrubsall, 
it seems that the renewed TUPE tends to resolve the problems linked to the 
transferor’s labor-only or labor-intensive service entities
126.  
In fact, the European Court of Justice, in Case C-13/95 (Süzen case)
127, 
made Council Directive 77/187 inapplicable to a transfer of such an entity 
unless the transferee takes on employees as well as the commercial activity on 
which they are deployed. Since then, British Courts and Tribunals have faced 
many difficulties  in interpreting, applying, distinguishing, and restricting the 
Süzen  principle,  with  deep  uncertainty over  circumstances  in  which TUPE 
regulations may cover changes of service provision contracts and doubts over 
the compatibility with the European law of the relevant UK case law
128. How-
ever, during the drawn-out consultation, the government has made clear its in-
tention to include changes of service provision contracts within the TUPE 
regulations’ ambit.  
The provisions provide that the first and second generation contracting-out 
of services and the bringing in-house of previously contracted out services will 
all be subject to the TUPE regulations whenever an “organized grouping of 
employees…has as its principal purpose the carrying out of the activities”
129 
under the service contract. The only exception is service contracts intended by 
the client to be in connection with a single and specific event or task of short 
term duration
130.  
At earlier stages of consultation, an exception for professional services was 
mooted and included in the draft regulations published in March 2005. How-
ever, the government was convinced that the disadvantages of any such provi-
sions – and the practical difficulty of providing for an effective and appropriate 
definition – outweighed the gains achieved. Therefore, no such exception is in-
cluded in the TUPE regulation amendment.  
So, changes of contractors providing office cleaning, workplace catering, 
security and guarding duties, refuse collection, and machinery maintenance are 
now included in the scope of the new TUPE regulations
131. For the TUPE 
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regulation to apply in any such case, the outgoing provider of services must 
have deployed an “organised grouping of employees” on the performance of 
the contract services.  
It must also be highlighted that the new TUPE regulations specifically pro-
vide that a single employee can be regarded as an organized grouping of em-
ployees – endorsing Case C-392/92 (Schmidt case)
132 – and the reference to 
“principal purpose” means that the employees do not have to be exclusively 
deployed on the specific contract service. Therefore, their employment in pe-
ripheral  or occasional  tasks  outside  that  contract would  not  jeopardize  the 
status of the economic entity. The new TUPE regulations do not apply in cases 
where the contract activities wholly or mainly supply goods for the client’s use, 
as it applies to service provision contracts only
133.  
The TUPE also redefined the transferor notification obligations. In particular, 
the transferor must notify the transferee in writing or in a readily accessible 
form of “employee liability information” relating to any employee assigned to 
the undertaking or service contract being transferred
134. This information in-
cludes:  
-  the identity and age of the employee;  
-  the employment particulars required by the written statement provisions 
of the Employment Right Act (ERA 1996), s. 1
135;  
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135 Which states that: 
(1) Where an employee begins employment with an employer, the employer shall give to the employee a written state-
ment of the particulars of employment.  
(2) The statement may (subject to section 2(4)) be given in installments and (whether or not given in installments) shall 
be given no later than two months after the beginning of the employment.  
(3) The statement shall contain particulars of—  
(a) the names of the employer and employee,  
(b) the date when the employment began, and  
(c) the date on which the employee’s period of continuous employment began (taking into account any employment 
with a previous employer which counts toward that period).  
(4) The statement shall also contain particulars, as at a specified date not more than seven days before the statement 
(or the instalment containing them) is given, of—  
(a) the scale or rate of remuneration or the method of calculating remuneration,  
(b) the intervals at which remuneration is paid (that is, weekly, monthly, or other specified intervals),  
(c) any terms and conditions relating to hours of work (including any terms and conditions relating to normal working 
hours),  
(d) any terms and conditions relating to any of the following—  
(i) entitlement to holidays, including public holidays and holiday pay (the particulars given being sufficient to enable 
the employee’s entitlement, including any entitlement to accrued holiday pay on the termination of employment, to be 
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-  information on any disciplinary or grievance procedures in respect to an 
employee within the previous two years;  
-  information on any court or tribunal case, claim, or action brought by an 
employee within the previous two years or that the employer has reasonable 
grounds for believing may be brought; and 
-  information on any collective agreement which will take effect after the 
transfer in relation to any employee transferred. 
 
This information must be given not less than 14 days before the relevant trans-
fer, or, in special circumstances, as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter. 
Any changes in the information after the notification must also be noted to the 
transferee. A claim for breach of this obligation to an employment tribunal 
must normally be made within three months of the transfer
136.  
Regarding the choice of the employees to be transferred, the 2006 TUPE 
amendments elevate to a statutory basis the ECJ decision in Case C-183/86
137 
that the employees who transfer will be those assigned to the part transferred. 
Assigned is stated to mean “assigned other than temporary basis”
138. The iden-
tification of which employees are assigned where will be a matter of fact for 
                                                                                                                       
(ii) incapacity for work due to sickness or injury, including any provision for sick pay, and  
(iii) pensions and pension schemes,  
(e) the length of notice which the employee is obliged to give and entitled to receive to terminate his contract of em-
ployment,  
(f) the title of the job which the employee is employed to do or a brief description of the work for which he is em-
ployed,  
(g) where the employment is not intended to be permanent, the period for which it is expected to continue or, if it is 
for a fixed term, the date when it is to end,  
(h) either the place of work or where the employee is required or permitted to work at various places, an indication of 
that and of the address of the employer,  
(j) any collective agreements which directly affect the terms and conditions of the employment, including where the 
employer is not a party, the persons by whom they were made, and  
(k) where the employee is required to work outside the United Kingdom for a period of more than one month—  
(i) the period for which he is to work outside the United Kingdom,  
(ii) the currency in which remuneration is to be paid while he is working outside the United Kingdom,  
(iii) any additional remuneration payable to him, and any benefits to be provided to or in respect of him, by reason of 
his being required to work outside the United Kingdom, and  
(iv) any terms and conditions relating to his return to the United Kingdom.  
(5) Subsection (4)(d)(iii) does not apply to an employee of a body or authority if—  
(a) the employee’s pension rights depend on the terms of a pension scheme established under any provision contained 
in or having effect under any Act, and  
(b) any such provision requires the body or authority to give to a new employee information concerning the em-
ployee’s pension rights or the determination of questions affecting those rights.  
136 SHRUBSALL, op. cit..   
137C-186/83, Arie Botzen and others v Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij BV, [1985] ERC 519. 
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the tribunal in any particular case. In particular, Duncan Web Offset (Maid-
stone) Ltd v Cooper (1995) IRLR 633 makes the following factors relevant:  
 
-  the amount of time spent on one part of business or the other;  
-  the amount of value given to each part by the employee;  
-  the term of the contract showing what the employee could be required 
to do;  
-  how the cost to the employer of the employee’s service had been allo-
cated between the parts of the business; and 
-  which part of the business manages the employees.  
 
The new provision also put the House of Lords’ decision in Lister v Forth Dry 
Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (1990) 1 AC 546, (1989) 1 All Er 1134 into 
place on a statutory basis. Consequently, the TUPE regulation protects those 
employees who would have been employed at the time of the transfer if they 
had not been dismissed before it and because of it.  
Regarding the dismissal issues, the TUPE regulation clarifies that a dismissal 
or variation of contract terms is permitted in cases where there is an ETO rea-
son entailing changes of the workforce. Obviously, employees affected will be 
entitled to redundancy compensation, but will not be treated as unfairly dis-
missed, provided that the usual procedural and substantive standards of fair-
ness set out in ERA 1996, s 98(4) are met
139.  
Finally, the amendments to TUPE introduced special provisions to facilitate 
the transfer of insolvent undertakings. In particular, certain of the transferor’s 
pre-existing debts owed to affected employees do not transfer to the trans-
feree, but are charged instead to the National Insurance Fund, and, fulfilling 
the obligations deriving from the second generation Directives, stated that, ex-
ceptionally, employers and employees representative are allowed to agree to the 
downward variation of employment contract terms to ensure the survival of 
the transferring business
140.  
However, for these provisions to apply, the transferor must be subject to 
“relevant insolvency proceedings”, defined as insolvency proceedings under 
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the supervision of an insolvency practitioner opened in relation to the trans-
feror but not with the purpose of liquidating the assets. The phrase covers any 
collective insolvency proceedings in which the whole or part of an undertaking 
is transferred to another entity as a going concern, but it does not cover any 
winding-up proceedings by either members or creditors where there is no such 
transfer. This therefore excludes bankruptcy, because the need to realize the 
assets of the undertaking takes precedence over the rights of the employees of 
the business.  
In those other cases where the transferor is insolvent but is the subject of a 
rescue procedure, such as administration, company, and individual voluntary 
arrangements, TUPE still applies although the Regulation offers a new flexibil-
ity to the insolvency practitioner whose purpose is to ensure the survival of the 
undertaking and the ability to sell it on as a going concern
141.  This flexibility is 
achieved by: 
 
a. defining a limit on debts owed to employees passing to the transferee; 
and 
b. admitting changes to an employee’s terms when this is to assist the sur-
vival of the undertaking or business. 
 
In fact, when the transferor is in one of the insolvency proceedings which aims 
to rescue the undertaking, the Government has agreed to subside that rescue 
by relieving the transferee of debts owed to employees which might otherwise 
have passed with the business. This establishes that all employees whose con-
tract of employment transfers by operation of the regulation will be eligible for 
the  statutory  insolvency  payments  set  out  in  Part  XII  of  the  Employment 
Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”)
142. These are usually available only when employ-
ment is terminated due to insolvency, but Reg. 8 (3) deems the employees’ 
contracts to have been terminated (even though they have not been), with the 
date of the transfer being treated as the date of termination, in order to allow 
them to claim from the National Insurance Fund for statutory redundancy pay, 
pay arrears (up to eight weeks), pay in lieu of notice, holiday pay (up to six 
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weeks), or a basic award of compensation for unfair dismissal: the transferee is 
relieved of these debts, which are met instead by the NIF, but any debts be-
yond those so met will pass to the transferee in the usual way. It is clear that 
these provisions will make it easier for the practitioner to sell the business as a 
going  concern  by  relieving  the  burden  of  its  associated  employee  debts, 
thereby making it more attractive to a potential purchaser
143.  
As it was under the old regulation, any variation in the terms of employ-
ment under the TUPE will be void if the reason for the variation is the transfer 
itself or a reason connected with the transfer which is not an ETO reason en-
tailing changes in the workforce. However, the new TUPE introduces a carve-
out from this rule, establishing that where there are “relevant insolvency pro-
ceedings”, the transferor, transferee, or insolvency practitioner may vary em-
ployment terms – e.g. reduce pay, overtime, or shift supplemental rates – pro-
vided agreement is reached with the employees’ representatives.  
This measure is clearly intended to remedy the inflexibility of the original 
TUPE, which brought the House of Lords, in Wilson v. St. Helens’ Borough 
Council
144, to hold that if the employees are transferred on the relevant transfer 
of undertakings under the TUPE Regulation, their terms and conditions can-
not lawfully be varied for a reason connected to the transfer, regardless of 
whether they consent to the variation and regardless of how long after the 
transfer they have been made. This meant, as indicated previously, that the 
only reliable way for an insolvent business to secure a change of terms would 
be to dismiss the employees and offer them employment on revised terms
145.  
However, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the changes in the terms of 
employment, the practitioner has to adhere to the procedure provided for by 
Reg. 9. This includes, for example, ensuring that employee representatives with 
whom the administrator intends to negotiate are properly selected, that where 
these representative are non-union, the agreement is in writing and signed by 
each representative, and a copy of the agreement is provided to all employees 
to whom it is intended to apply
146. 
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The variation must be designed to safeguard employment opportunities by 
ensuring the survival of the business transferred, and so it must be shown that 
a reduction in employment costs is necessary to make the continuation of the 
business commercially viable. When this insolvency provision applies, an ETO 





This work has traced the application and revision process of the Acquired 
Rights Directive in the context of insolvency proceedings, focusing on the role 
of community and national (British and Italian) case law.  
This process has moved through several stages. In the first stage, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice was the principal actor. Being called upon by the Mem-
ber States to decide whether the scope of the Directive extended to a situation 
in which the transferor of an undertaking was adjudged insolvent, the ECJ 
widely interpreted the Directive. It held that the Directive did not apply to 
proceedings designed to liquidate the transferor’s assets while it did apply to 
proceedings in which the main purpose was to safeguard the assets and, where 
possible, to continue the business of the undertaking. Applying this reasoning 
in other judgements, the Court held that the Directive did apply to transfers by 
undertakings under the Italian special administration of large undertakings
148, 
to transferors which had been declared to be in critical difficulties under the 
relevant Italian provisions and to transfers made by companies in judicial or 
voluntary winding-ups under relevant Belgian law.  
In the second stage, the national courts had to apply the principles estab-
lished in the case law of the ECJ in domestic insolvency proceedings. British 
courts, once they had accepted the new principle of compulsory transfer of 
employment relationships upon the transfer of a business adapted (although 
not without technical difficulties) the principles developed by the ECJ to do-
mestic law.  
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Italian courts, in contrast, facing pre-existing national laws partially in con-
flict with the Directive, and made a number of references for preliminary rul-
ing to the ECJ. In the possible clash between those opposing interests, the Ital-
ian courts granted absolute priority to the protection of employees’ rights.  
In this second stage, academic writers have emphasized the problems aris-
ing from the application of the Directive to the transfer of insolvent busi-
nesses. The prospect of taking over accrued liabilities under employment con-
tracts might deter a prospective transferee from purchasing the insolvent busi-
nesses. Therefore, a directive designed, at least in part, to facilitate the transfer 
of business might act as a deterrent to such transfers and as an impediment to 
the rescue of businesses. 
Moreover, in order to reduce the risk of a connection with any subsequent 
transfer, insolvency practitioners might make dismissals at an earlier stage than 
they would otherwise, with the unintended result being that the effect of a Di-
rective aimed at the protection of employment would reduce job security.     
The result of such a dialogue carried out by national courts and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice has been a new Directive amending the previous one, 
which adopts much of the jurisprudence emanating from the decisions of the 
ECJ.  
The Amending Directive granted Member States a wide degree of discre-
tion. However, it still contains some provisions likely to be heavily discussed. 
The balance between the interests of workers and those of other creditors has 
not yet been defined in a satisfactory way.  
The difficult task of finding a reasonable balance in this area is still in the 
hands of Member States. In this sense, the recently introduced TUPE amend-
ments seem to define a coherent interaction between the conflicting interests. 
The effectiveness of this model, however, still has to be tested in real world 






 Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency Proceedings in the UK, Italy and ECJ    61
References 
 
BARNARD C. (2000), EC Employment Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
BOSCATI L. (1996), “Il trasferimento di aziende in crisi al vaglio della Corte di 
Giustizia”, 6 Lav. Giur, pp. 460 - 464. 
COLLINS H. (1986), “Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvency”  15 ILJ, pp. 
144 - 150. 
DAVIES P. (1989) , “Acquired Rights, Creditors’ Rights, Freedom of Contract 
and Industrial Democracy”, 9 YEL, pp. 21 - 45. 
DAVIES P. (1988),  “Amendments to the Acquired Rights Directive”, 17 ILJ, 
pp. 249 - 250. 
DAVIES, P. “The European Court of Justice, National Courts and the Member 
States” in DAVIES, LYON-CAEN, SCIARRA AND SIMITIS, European Community 
Labour Law, Oxford, pp. 124 - 125. 
DAVIES, P. (1998), “Amendments to the Acquired Rights Directive”, 27  ILJ,  
pp. 365 - 368.   
DE LUCA L. (1998), “Salvaguardia dei diritti dei lavoratori in caso di trasferi-
mento  d’azienda:  funzione  del  diritto comunitario  e  della  giurisprudenza 
della Corte di giustizia nella interpretazione e nell’applicazione della nuova 
disciplina nazionale”, Foro It. IV, p. 288.  
DHINSA D. (2006), “The draft TUPE Regulation and insolvency”, 19 (1) Insol-
vency  Intelligence, pp. 8 - 10.   
FOGLIA, R. (1991), “Trasferimenti di aziende, procedure conservative e diritto 
comunitario”, Dir. Lav., pp. 329 - 338. 
HOUSE  OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE  ON  THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
“Transfer of Undertakings: Acquired Rights” Session 1995-96, 5th Report, 
HL Paper 38, p. 21. 
LAMBERTUCCI G. (1996), “La disciplina del trasferimento d’azienda in crisi al 
vaglio della Corte di Giustizia”, Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, p. 274. 
LAMBERTUCCI G. (1999), Le tutele del lavoratore nella circolazione dell’azienda, Giap-
pichelli, Torino. 
LECCESE V. (1999), “Italian Courts, the ECJ and Transfers of Undertakings: A 
Multi-Speed Dialogue?” 5 EuLJ, pp. 315 - 320. G. SIGILLÒ MASSARA  62
MENGHINI P. (2000), “L’attenuazione delle tutele individuali dei lavoratori in 
caso di trasferimento d’azienda in crisi o soggetta a procedure concorsuali 
dopo la direttiva 50/98 e il d.lgs. 270/99”, Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della pre-
videnza sociale, p. 229.  
PELAGGI (1998), “Trasferimento d’azienda nelle imprese in crisi, potere di re-
cesso del cedente e del cessionario ed effetti del licenziamento illegittimo al-
la luce della giurisprudenza comunitaria”, Massimario di Giurisprudenza del La-
voro, p. 628 . 
POLLARD, D. (1996), “Insolvent companies and TUPE”, 25 (3) ILJ, pp. 191 - 
202. 
ROMEI, R. (1995), “Il trasferimento di un’azienda in crisi dinanzi alla Corte di 
Giustizia delle Comunità Europee”, Mass. Giur. Lav., p. 492. 
SANTORO PASSARELLI G. (2005), “Il trasferimento di parte dell’azienda tra li-
bertà dell’imprenditore e tutela dei lavoratori”, in AA.VV., Dialoghi tra dottrina 
e giurisprudenza, Giuffrè, Milano, p. 28. 
SHRUBSALL V., “Employment Rights and Business Transfers - Changes to the 
Acquired Rights Directive”, at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/ issue5/ 
maps/b-bar.map.shrubsall5_files/bar.gif. 
SHRUBSALL V. (1998), “Employment Rights and Business Transfers - Changes 
to the Acquired Rights Directive”, Web Journal of Current Legal Issues. 
SHRUBSALL V. (2006), “The New TUPE Regulation”, New Law Journal, p. 584.   
VILLANI (2000), Trasferimento d'azienda. Profili di diritto del lavoro e della previdenza 
sociale, Utet, Torino, pp. 174 - 175. McGraw-Hill 
ISBN 978-88-386-6247-8
9 788838 662478
Transfer of Undertakings, Insolvency
Proceedings in the United Kingdom
and Italy, and the European Court




cop_15.qxd  6-09-2010  15:32  Pagina 1